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This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine the role of institutional 
investors in stock market efficiency. Institutions are important and influential market 
participants. This study aims to analyze whether institutional investor trading is consistent 
with higher attention and better skill, what is the impact of institutional trading on future 
asset prices and how does institutional trading relate to the liquidity in the market. 
The first chapter of the dissertation analyzes institutional investors’ response to 
stock level liquidity shocks. I find that institutions, especially the transient ones, buy stocks 
that experience positive liquidity shocks and sell those that experience negative ones. High-
low decile portfolios representing difference between stocks with positive and negative 
liquidity shocks are related to future increase in institutional trading 53% higher than the 
amount of average monthly institutional trading. Changes in ownership induced by the 
high-low liquidity shocks positively predict 5.03% annualized return in the subsequent 
month. This trading activity further amplifies the liquidity shocks through feedback effects. 
The results suggest that institutional investors help improve market efficiency by exploiting 
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the mispricing associated with liquidity shocks, although their trading exacerbates stock 
level liquidity uncertainty. 
The second chapter examines trading behavior of institutional investors in attention 
grabbing stocks. I find that institutions increase their trading volume on high attention days, 
both buys and sells. Both liquidity demanding and supplying institutions are abnormally 
active on those days, despite significantly higher transaction costs. I document outstanding 
demand for liquidity by institutional investors on high attention days. Those findings 
suggest that institutional trades are consistent with limited attention theory. Institutions’ 
trading decisions result in poor performance, especially following demand buys, and even 
more so on high attention days. Professional money managers who supply liquidity enjoy 
positive long-term performance, particularly those trading on high attention days, and they 
benefit from higher transaction costs. Overall the study contributes to the discussion on the 
role of institutional investors in the stock market, pointing to their low sophistication and 
poor trading decisions, which may lead to exacerbation of the mispricing in the market. On 
the other hand, some of them serve a positive and stabilizing role as liquidity suppliers. 
The third chapter studies aggregate herding behavior of institutional investors over 
35 years. I find significant evidence of aggregate herding over that time period, based on 
Sias (2004) dynamic herding measure. Interestingly, I observe large shocks to herding 
activity during the dot com bubble in 2000-2001, in times of high uncertainty regarding 
the valuations of new companies. There is a positive relation between herding and 
aggregate market uncertainty as measured by the average stock correlation. The analysis 
of relation between herding and future returns does not however point to the distorting 
impact of herding on information incorporation into stock prices. I document a positive 
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relationship between herding activity and next quarter aggregate market return. There is no 
reversal in the following 3 quarters, contributing to the view that herding may in fact 
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Chapter 1 Liquidity shocks and institutional investors 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent financial crisis has brought everyone’s attention towards the issue of liquidity 
changes in the stock market and related trading by institutional investors. Liquidity is an 
important component of the market, with huge impact on its efficiency (Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2008, 2011)). Institutional investors hold 63.3% of all US equities 
(Securities Industry Association Fact Book (2015)) and are estimated to account for 70-
96% of overall trading volume (DeVault, Sias and Starks (2014) after Jones and Lipson 
(2005)). Their trading can have a significant impact on the market efficiency and liquidity. 
Liquidity tends to vary substantially over time and is subject to sudden changes. It 
has been shown that in the cross section, illiquid stocks have on average higher future 
returns to compensate for transaction costs (Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1996)) and persistent negative shocks to liquidity should decrease 
current price and increase subsequent returns (Amihud (2002), Jones (2002) and Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005)).  Liquidity is also characterized by autocorrelation, so its shocks are 
persistent (Amihud (2002), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Chordia et al. (2001)). 
Liquidity shocks result from public information releases (e.g. earnings 
announcements), company events (like stock splits, share buy backs), past stock returns, 
sensitivity to market liquidity and asymmetric information-related uncertainty. While 
market-wide liquidity shocks are quite easy to observe, individual changes in stock 
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liquidity are much harder to notice and understand by the investors. Bali, Peng, Shen and 
Tang (BPST, 2014) present evidence that due to investors' inattention and stock illiquidity, 
stock market underreacts to stock-specific liquidity shocks leading to both their 
contemporaneous and future positive relationship with the returns, with predictability up 
to 6 months.  
The intention of this paper is to explore the slow adjustment of stock prices to 
liquidity shocks from BPST (2014). The authors find that predictability of future returns is 
stronger for stocks with low institutional ownership. Since institutional investors, in 
particular the short-term oriented transient group, are likely more attentive, they may 
observe liquidity shocks and trade on them. Theory predicts that a persistent change in 
liquidity should be associated with a change in price of the same direction. If such price 
adjustment is delayed, thereby leading to mispricing, institutions may exploit the post-
liquidity shock drift by buying stocks with positive shocks and selling those with negative 
shock, which would lead to a positive liquidity shock-institutional trading relationship. 
Such trading by institutional investors could reduce post-liquidity shock drift and improve 
price efficiency. 
The existing literature has analyzed the reaction of institutions to systematic 
market-wide liquidity shocks and their impact on stock pricing efficiency (Scholes (2000), 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Manconi, Massa and Yasuda (2012), Ben-David 
Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012), Anand, Irvine, Puckett and Venkataraman (2013), Dong, 
Feng, Sadka (2014) among many others). Those papers concentrated on the big aggregate 
liquidity events, usually related to funding liquidity drops, fire sales and other crisis 
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situations (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). This work, in contrast, concentrates on 
individual, stock-level liquidity shocks in the interest of establishing general patterns of 
institutional trading in response to those, not only in times of extreme market movements. 
How institutional investors impact asset prices when they react to liquidity shocks is an 
important empirical question, pertaining to market efficiency.  
The institutional reaction to stock-specific liquidity shocks that is examined in this 
paper will likely differ to their reaction to market-wide crisis-related liquidity events. First 
of all, systematic liquidity shocks during market crises do not characterize normal trading 
(Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Chordia et al. (2000)). There are number of reasons for 
which one may expect a different investor behavior. Individual, stock-related liquidity 
shocks are less visible than market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Massive redemptions and 
margin calls are less likely in the normal market environment. 
I start by examining how institutional investors respond after observing a liquidity 
shock. The main liquidity shock measure (LIQUS) used is the standardized difference 
between the monthly Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and its preceding 12-month 
average. To measure institutional trading, I use both direct high frequency trade-level 
institutional trading data from ANcerno database and proxies for institutional trading based 
on Thomson-Reuters 13f quarterly institutional holdings data. The use of direct and high 
frequency data particularly allows me to conduct a dynamic and more precise analysis of 
institutional trading that would not be possible with quarterly data.  
I find that institutional investors react positively to liquidity shocks by increasing 
their holdings following positive shocks and decreasing them following negative shocks. 
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Decile portfolios representing difference between stocks with positive and negative 
liquidity shocks are related to the increase in institutional monthly trading by 0.07% in 
ANcerno database, which is 153% of the average monthly institution trading, and 0.48% 
in 13f, which is 103% of the average, pointing to a substantial economic significance. 
Moreover, the relative change in the number of all institutional shareholders is also 
positively related to liquidity shocks. The difference between high and low liquidity 
portfolio in terms of change in the number of institutional shareholders is 2.96% (69% of 
the average monthly change in the number of institutional shareholders). Those findings 
are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, subperiod and subsample 
analysis. When I extract from the liquidity shock its individual, stock related part (not 
connected with market liquidity jumps), the results remain significant and even stronger 
(for 13f transient institutions), confirming this study’s focus on the effects of individual 
stock-level shocks.   
Trading in response to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks requires investors to be 
attentive and buy and sell stocks actively and frequently.  I use the institution classification 
from Bushee (2001) to identify transient, short-term oriented institutions, characterized by 
high turnover in 13f, as well as dedicated investors with low turnover and long investment 
horizon and quasi-indexers who passively follow the market. The results show that the 
positive relation between liquidity shocks and quarterly institutional trading is mainly 
driven by the transient institutions.  
Institutional trading on liquidity shocks is positively related to future returns. The 
amount of institutional trading induced by LIQUS differential between high and low 
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liquidity shock decile positively predicts an annualized 5.03% return in the subsequent 
month. The magnitude is remarkable and constitutes almost half of the overall return 
generated by liquidity shocks documented by BPST (2014) (0.7%-1.2% return per month, 
translating to 9%-15% return per year). Moreover, the positive 5.5% return is in stark 
contrast to the annualized negative 1.01% return predicted by the average unconditional 
monthly institutional trading, likely due to temporary price pressure.  
Taken together, the analysis presented here supports that institutions in aggregate 
are attentive, sophisticated investors that help arbitrage away mispricing in the market. 
They appear to understand the pricing implications of liquidity shocks suggested by theory 
and exploit the slow adjustment of stock prices following liquidity shocks well. While they 
extract arbitrage profits, their trading helps reduce market’s underreaction to liquidity 
shocks and improve price efficiency. 
I further extend this analysis to see how liquidity shocks and institutional trading 
are endogenously related to each other. Using panel VAR analysis, I find that institutions 
not only simply exploit the mispricing caused by prior liquidity shocks, but their trading 
also positively predicts future liquidity shocks. This suggests that institutional trading 
amplifies liquidity shocks, introducing more liquidity risk into the stock.  
This study contributes to the literature on institutional investor’s trading, liquidity 
and market efficiency. It introduces a dynamic stock-level liquidity dimension, 
complementing the work on institutional reaction to market wide liquidity changes. While 
many existing studies find that institutional investors may damage market efficiency in 
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crisis times, this work shows that institutions can indeed improve price efficiency by their 
general behavior in response to individual shocks.  
This paper also contributes to the debate on the role of institutional investors trading 
on anomalies and correcting mispricing. Despite a number of studies showing role of 
institutions as arbitrageurs (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007), Irvine, Lipson and Puckett 
(2007) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009), among many others), recent literature started 
questioning their ability to identify and appropriately trade on anomalies. Edelen, Ince, and 
Kadlec (2016) show that institutions actually may cause mispricing in the form of a number 
of well-known anomalies.  This study shows that institutions are able to notice stock-level 
liquidity shocks and trade on them in the direction that corrects mispricing. Moreover, the 
finding that transient institutions are the group most active in trading on liquidity shocks 
supports the claim that active trading can be value-enhancing (Pastor, Stambaugh, and 
Taylor (2015)). 
Finally, this study contributes to the feedback trading literature (see DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and 
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004)) with its analysis of how institutions impact future 
liquidity shocks. Even though institutional trading helps to correct mispricing, it also 
destabilizes future liquidity by enhancing the shocks and contributing to the transaction 
cost uncertainty.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents a review of literature, 
Section 1.3 describes the sources of data and variables used, Section 1.4 presents the main 
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results, Section 1.5 discusses robustness checks, Section 1.6 presents panel VAR analysis 
of feedback effect of institutional trading on liquidity shocks and Section 1.7 concludes. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
Many authors have argued that trading and preferences of institutional investors 
may have significant impact on market efficiency and liquidity. Institutions differ from 
other investors due to legal environment, superior knowledge, and different risk 
preferences (Gompers and Metrick (2001)). They are also commonly assumed to be 
sophisticated in information processing (Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005)) and more 
attentive. Institutions have relative advantage in gathering and processing information in 
financial reports (Bartov, Krinsky, and Radhakrishnan (2000)) as they devote more time to 
searching stocks than individuals, strategically narrow their search, and benefit from 
economies of scale (Barber and Odean (2008) and Rubin (2007)).  
Extant evidence suggests that institutions increase price efficiency. Collins, Gong 
and Hribar (2003) show that stocks with high institutional ownership and frequent 
institutional trading have stock prices more accurately reflecting persistence of accruals. 
Furthermore, institutional ownership reduces post earnings announcement drift (Bartov et 
al. (2000) and Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz (2009)). Finally, institutional investors 
improve efficiency and information environment as stocks with high institutional 
ownership have prices more closely following random walk (Boehmer and Kelley (2009)). 
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On the other hand, there is increasing evidence of the detrimental impact of 
institutional investors on market efficiency. Edelen, Ince and Kadlec (2015) provide 
evidence of institutions trading on the wrong side of anomalies. Institutions have been 
shown to herd (Sias (2004)), trade on momentum (Cai, Kaul, and Zheng (2000) and Sias, 
Starks, and Titman (2002)) and sentiment (DeVault, Sias and Starks (2015)). 
A lot of discussion has been devoted to the relationship between institutional 
trading and market-level liquidity changes. Dong et al. (2011) show that funds with high 
exposure to market liquidity perform better than those with low liquidity beta, which they 
mainly attribute to managerial skill.  Such funds choose exposure to higher information 
asymmetry environment related to lower liquidity likely because they possess unique 
ability or private information. A large number of authors have looked into the institutions’ 
behavior following market-wide negative liquidity shocks associated with crisis times, in 
particular whether institutional investors first dispose of liquid or illiquid stocks. 
Vayanos (2004) argues that managers facing customer withdrawals in times of high 
volatility are less willing to hold illiquid stocks (flight to quality). In a similar spirit, 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) claim that liquidity providers are less willing to make 
markets in volatile illiquid securities due to higher margin requirements. As a result, 
funding and market liquidity reinforce each other leading to liquidity spirals and liquidity 
dry-ups. Ben-Rephel (2014) examines institutional behavior following negative liquidity 
shocks as inferred from the spikes in market volatility measured by VIX. He finds that 
mutual funds reduce their holdings of illiquid stocks in such crisis periods due to investor 
outflows, which creates a channel for liquidity pricing. In a paper by Anand et al. (2013) 
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liquidity suppliers (buy-side institutions) withdraw from risky, illiquid securities during 
2007-2009 crisis due to credit rationing by lenders, leading to liquidity dry-ups.  
On the other end of the argument, Scholes (2000) asserts that during crisis times, 
investors unwind positions by selling most liquid stocks first in order to minimize price 
impact. Manconi et al. (2012) show evidence that mutual funds with heavy exposure to 
then-illiquid AAA securitized bonds begun by selling liquid assets, such as corporate 
bonds, which contributed to spreading the crisis of 2007-2008. In the work by Ben-David 
et al. (2012), massive hedge funds equity selloffs due to redemptions and margin calls 
during the crisis (second half of 2008) were concentrated in volatile and liquid stocks 
(forced deleveraging). 
Brown, Carlin, and Lobo (2010) combine both views by proposing an optimal 
liquidation strategy in volatile times, where myopic investors sell more liquid assets to 
deleverage position, and nonmyopic ones may postpone selling most liquid securities 
expecting more severe liquidity needs in the future. 
The above literature concentrates on the reaction on trading of institutions facing 
market-wide liquidity changes, often coexisting with funding liquidity shocks 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)), which strongly affect institutional investors 
depending on external financing. Moreover institutions are often forced to meet margin 
calls and redemption demands and this may drive them to behavior deteriorating market 
efficiency. This paper’s focus is on individual, stock level liquidity shocks and general 
trading strategies of institutional investors, which would less likely be affected by funding 
shocks and crisis-related pressures.  
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The ability to observe idiosyncratic liquidity shocks may however be constrained 
by the limited attention. Idiosyncratic shocks are less visible (require more attention) than 
market ones (see Peng and Xiong (2006)). It has been shown that limited attention of 
investors may lead to their underreaction to stock recommendations (Loh (2010)), post 
earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) Hou, Peng, Xiong (2009)) 
and earnings momentum (when inattention is interacted with investor biases such as 
extrapolative expectations and overconfidence, Hou et al. (2009)). Limited investor 
attention leads to price underreaction to information, lowering market efficiency and 
causing post-information drifts. Institutional investors may however be less subject to 
limited attention due to their higher sophistication, access to private information (via direct 
contact with firms and analysts) and top-technology resources and specialists (Hendershott, 
Livdan, and Schürhoff (2015)). 
The final part of this study analyses the impact of institutional trading on future 
liquidity shocks. The feedback effect of trading by sophisticated market participants has 
been studied from various angles. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) 
discuss how speculators’ feedback trading leads to volatility increase. Rational investors 
may engage in positive feedback strategies to benefit from the subsequent noise trader 
trends. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) analyze short-
term amplification of mispricing by arbitrageurs. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) propose 
a model where rational investors may exacerbate pricing bubbles due to problems with 
coordination and timing of their strategies. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) show how 




1.3 Data and variable constructions 
This paper uses two sources of institutional trading data. Its main analysis 
concentrates on high frequency institutional trading as reported by ANcerno Ltd in the 
period from January 1999 to September 2011. In the main tests, I also use quarterly 
holdings data from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 13f database ranging from 
January 1981 to December 2012.  
The ANcerno Ltd (formerly a unit of Abel/Noser Corp.) is an established consulting 
company that analyses equity trading transaction costs of its intuitional investor clients 
(pension plan sponsors, money managers and brokers).  According to Puckett and Yan 
(2011), ANcerno institutional trading accounts for a significant fraction (10%) of 
institutional trading volume and is representative of the financial industry trading behavior. 
The database presents a range of advantages (Franzoni and Plazzi (2013)). If offers a 
complete and detailed trade-by-trade trading data of the subscribing institution (identified 
by a code allowing tracking over time and in cross-section) since subscription date. The 
information reported includes: side of the transaction, execution price and volume, time of 
the transaction, costs, stock’s CUSIP. Short sales are also reported albeit not identified. 
ANcerno clients subscribe voluntarily to obtain a fair analysis of their trading costs which 
reduces probability of self-reporting bias. Moreover, the database does not suffer from 
survivorship bias – institutions who reported in the past remain in the data set. There is also 




The potential type of selection bias in ANcerno database results from the fact that 
possibly only the more sophisticated and careful institutions would choose to have their 
transaction costs analyzed by a consultant (Anand et al. (2012)). These are also more likely 
to be actively trading institutions. 
The stocks traded by ANcerno and institutions reporting with 13f filings are 
comparable (Puckett and Yan (2011), Anand et al. (2012)). Table 1.1 compares main 
characteristics of the stocks traded by institutions from the two databases. Due to different 
sample period, I limit the comparison to the overlapping time from January 1999 to 
September 2011. The stocks traded by ANcerno are on average slightly larger, more liquid, 
with higher beta and analyst dispersion (also more analysts following) and lower book-to-
market. The differences do not appear to be very large. The overall number of stocks traded 
by institutions in both data sets is similar. 
The trade by trade data is aggregated into monthly net trading by all institutions in 
a given stock i in a month t, scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the month t adjusted 
for stock splits and other distributions. 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 =




The data retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 13f database 
(formerly CDA/Spectrum) consists of common stock  holdings  and  transactions  of  
institutional managers  with  more  than  USD  100  million  of  securities  under  
discretionary  management  as  reported  on  Form  13F  filed with  the  SEC (this applies 
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to equity positions greater than 10,000 shares or with fair market value of at least 
$200,000).  
The 13f sample includes banks, insurance companies, asset management 
companies, hedge funds, pension funds and other. They differ with respect to investment 
horizon, objectives, styles, legal requirements, competition and informational role (Yan 
and Zhang (2009)).  Observation of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and trading on them 
requires investors to trade actively and frequently. Bushee (2001), classifies institutional 
investors into three types: transient, quasi-indexing and dedicated, using factor and cluster 
analysis based on institutions past investment behavior.1 Transient institutions have high 
portfolio turnover, short-term horizon as well as highly diversified portfolio holdings, thus 
are most likely to exploit advantages related to noticing liquidity shocks. Two other groups 
of investors are less active; dedicated institutions are long-term oriented and have more 
concentrated holdings, while quasi-indexing firms adhere to a passive buy-and-hold 
strategy.  
The Institutional Ownership ratio (IOR) is calculated as the sum of all stocks held 
by 13f reporting institutions divided by shares outstanding from CRSP. Both numbers are 
adjusted for stock splits and other distributions.2 I also adjust for reporting gaps in the 13f 
data. Institutional ownership ratios greater than 1 are winsorised at 1 (this problem occurs 
for 1.9% of observations).3 The change in IOR (DIOR), which is used to proxy for 
                                                 
1 I obtain the classification information from Brian Bushee website. See also Bushee and Goodman (2007). 
2 13f database reports two dates for each observation; RDATE (effective ownership date) and FDATE 
(Vintage date for which stocks are adjusted in the database) – I account for this date disparity when 
calculating stock adjustment. We also remove “stale” entries. 
3 I repeat the analysis in a sample excluding observations with ownership ratios greater than 100%. The 
results are almost identical. For discussion of Institutional Ownership Ratio greater than one see Glushow, 
Moussawi and Palacios, WRDS (2009).  
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institutional trading within a quarter, is a difference between values of IOR at the beginning 
and end of the quarter.   
 
𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =








I perform this analysis both for all institutions included in the Thomson Reuters 13f 
database, as well as for different institution types as specified by Bushee (2001). I compute 
the change in IOR for transient, dedicated and quasi-indexing institutions as the difference 
in the proportion of shares outstanding held by a given type of institution. If information 
about ownership by a given group is missing for a given stock in quarter t, it is treated as 
“0%” ownership by given group of a given stock.4 See Appendix 1.1 for characteristics of 
different Bushee investor groups. 
Another variable that can be used as a proxy for institutional informed trading is 
the percentage change in the number of a stock’s institutional investors, PC_NII. It is 
calculated as the difference in the number of institutions holding the stock at the beginning 
and the end of the quarter divided by the number of all institutions holding stock at the 
beginning of the quarter.  
                                                 




# 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−# 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1
*100 
(1.3) 
Dior may be influenced by a small number of large institutions changing holdings 
(Edelen et al. (2015)). In contrast, PC_NII captures entries and exits of any institutions. 
Entry and exit trading of a group of more active and attentive institutions who pay attention 
to stock liquidity changes can be more visible in PC_NII than in a DIOR variable. 
Therefore, this variable accounts for institutional investor heterogeneity; Gue and Qui 
(2014) show that the predictive power of PC_NII for future stock returns is mainly due to 
the trading of high turnover institutions.  
Values of ANcerno Trading, PC_NII, DIOR and DIOR for different types of 
investors are winsorised at 1% and 99% each quarter to avoid outliers. For firms with no 
institutional investors at the beginning of the quarter, the values of PC_NII and DIOR are 
zero. 
Daily and monthly stock data comes from the Center for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP), company accounting data is from Compustat and analyst forecasts are from 
I/B/E/S. Observations include common stocks (CRSP codes 10 and 11) listed on NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ. Only stocks with price higher than $5 and lower than $1000 are 
included to mitigate market microstructure issues. 
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Illiquidity of the stock (ILLIQ) is measured monthly, following Amihud (2002), as 
the average of daily ratios of a daily return Ri,d to dollar trading volume VOLDi,d . ILLIQ 
is scaled by 106 and the values of ILLIQ are winsorised at 1% and 99% each quarter. 
 





ILLIQ measures the daily impact of order flow on price arising from adverse selection and 
inventory costs (Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Amuhud (2002)) in the spirit of Kyle 
(1985).5 Amihud’s illiquidity measure is easy to calculate and based on a readily available 
data.  Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) show that it is an accurate measure of price 
impact of trade and is comparable to liquidity measures based on intraday data. According 
to Hasbrouk (2009), Amihud’s measure’s correlation with Kyle’s lambda is 0.82. 
Monthly liquidity shock is calculated following BPST (2014) as the negative 
difference between illiquidity in a given month and its past 12-month average, thus a 
positive value of LIQUS signifies a positive (liquidity-improving) shock. I further 
standardize the liquidity measure by dividing it by the stock’s past 12-month standard 
deviation, which allows to extract the magnitude and importance of shocks relative to 
security’s usual liquidity variability. The values of LIQUS are winsorised at 1% and 99% 
each quarter. 
                                                 
5 In the Kyle (1985) model, order flow based on market orders is perceived as a signal by the market maker, 
from which he tries to extract information.  Since he doesn’t know if the flow comes from informed or 









As discussed in the Introduction, institutional investors are known to react to the 
systematic market liquidity and its changes. To address the concern that idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks could coincide with market wide, much more visible, liquidity change, I 
also partition the illiquidity shock variable into individual shock and market shock. In 
particular, I first construct a market illiquidity variable, as an equal average of individual 









where Nt is the number of stocks in a given month. Monthly systematic market liquidity 







I then run a time series rolling regression of individual stock liquidity shocks 
(LIQUS) on systematic market liquidity shocks (MLIQUS) over 60 month rolling window 
(with minimum 24 observations).  
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 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡𝑀𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡, (1.8) 
where residuals εi,t extracted from this regression (variable INDSHOCK) proxy for 
individual stock related liquidity shock. Variable INDSHOCK is winsorized at 1% and 
99% each quarter. 
Liquidity shocks, illiquidity level and control variables are measured as of the last 
day of the quarter (t) preceding the institutional trading quarter (month) (t+1). If variables 
are calculated from daily data, they require at least 15 daily observations. 
A number of stock characteristics can potentially impact institutions’ trading. To 
analyze the effect of liquidity shocks on institutional change in ownership, following 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) and BPST (2014), I introduce the following control variables: 
book-to-market ratio (LNBM), momentum (MOM), short-term return (RET), idiosyncratic 
stock volatility (IVOL) as well as shocks to stock volatility (IVOLU), beta (BETA) and 
dividend yield (DY), illiquidity measure (ILLIQ), size – logarithm of market value 
(LNME), standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and analyst earnings forecast dispersion 
(DISP). I also include the value of lagged trading variable. The detailed descriptions of 
variable construction are available in Appendix 2. 
Figure 1.1 presents time-series trend of illiquidity and liquidity shocks. Illiquidity 
is characterized by large variation and it fluctuated over the sample period, with peaks in 
1988 (following October 1987 market crash) and 2009 (as a result of the recent financial 
crisis). Downward spikes in average yearly liquidity shocks (LIQUS) indicate liquidity 
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dry-ups following 1987 crash, fall of LTCM and Russian debt crisis in 1998 and the largest 
drop in 2008, in the middle of financial crisis. 
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics (Panel A for ANcerno database, Panel B for 
13f). Mean and median of liquidity shock variable, LIQUS, are positive indicating an 
improvement of liquidity over the sample period. The variable is characterized by a large 
variation, with standard deviation 15 (for ANcerno, 17 for 13f) times larger than the mean. 
Standard deviation of trading variable for ANcerno institutions is 32 times larger 
than its mean, also pointing to substantial variation. The variable is positive on average, 
suggesting overall increase in institutional ownership. Similar conclusions can be drawn 
from analyzing institutional ownership statistics from 13f data. Standard deviation of 
institutional ownership change is 11 times larger than its mean, especially for dedicated 
and transient institutions (66 and 35 times respectively). 
Average institutional ownership in the 13f sample is 45%. As shown in Figure 2, 
institutional ownership increased over time, from 24% in 1981 to 67% in 2012 and thus 
both the change in the institutional ownership ratio and change in number of institutional 
shareholders are positive on average (0.47% and 4.17% respectively).  
Table 1.3 presents the time series average of cross-sectional Pearson correlation 
matrices for both data sets. ANcerno trading as well as change in institutional ownership 
both for all institutions (DIOR) and for transient ones (DIOR_TRANS) are negatively 
correlated with illiquidity, as expected due to institutional preference for liquid stocks. 
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Moreover all institutional trading variables are positively correlated with liquidity shocks, 
suggesting that institutions observe idiosyncratic shocks and trade in their direction. 
Institutional ownership and the number of institutional owners are very strongly 
positively correlated with log market value and thus controlling for size is crucial in this 
analysis. All trading variables’ negative correlations with size suggest that institutions 
increase ownership in smaller companies, a result consistent with Blume and Keim (2014) 
analysis of time-series trends in institutional ownership. They show that in the period 1980-
2010, institutions changed their holdings preferences from large to small stocks and in 
recent years underweight large market value stocks and overweight small market value 
stocks relative to market weights. 
In both data sets liquidity shocks hold the strongest positive correlation (>13%) 
with size, momentum, return and earnings surprises.  
 
1.4 Institutional trading and liquidity shocks 
In this section, I investigate institutional trading in response to liquidity shocks. 
1.4.1 Univariate portfolio sorts 
To examine the institutions’ reaction to liquidity shocks, each month I sort the 
stocks in the sample into ten portfolios according to liquidity shocks. The decile portfolios 
are based on NYSE breakpoints to mitigate the influence of the large number of small 
stocks from Amex and NASDAQ. I then calculate the decile average of the institutional 
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trading as measured in the following month. In case of the quarterly 13f data, I sort based 
on the liquidity shocks measured in the last month of the quarter preceding the quarter of 
inferred institutional trading (for example, liquidity is measured in March and the 
institutional trading variables are inferred from the quarter from April to June). Table 1.4 
presents the results.  
The difference between the ANcerno institutional trading in the high and low 
liquidity shock portfolios equals 7% (153% of variable’s mean and of 5% of its standard 
deviation) and is significant at 1%. Selling activity is only observed in two portfolios with 
the most negative liquidity shocks.  
For 13f, the significant difference in the change in the number of institutional 
shareholders (PC_NII) between extreme liquidity shock portfolios equals 2.9% (that is 
69% of variable’s mean and 16% of its standard deviation). As liquidity shocks increases, 
the increase in the value of PC_NII is almost monotonic (except the highest liquidity shock 
decile).  Similarly, when institutional trading is measured by the change in institutional 
ownership ratio (DIOR), the high-low liquidity shock difference is 0.48% (103% of 
DIOR’s mean and 10% of its standard deviation), also significant at 1%, again with almost 
monotonic increase in institutional trading across deciles. These results provide evidence 
for the positive relation between liquidity shocks and institutional trading. 
When I classify institutions into separate categories, the results show that the 
positive relation between liquidity shocks and quarterly institutional trading is mainly 
driven by the transient institutions: they sell stocks whose liquidity worsens and buy those 
with improvement in liquidity. The difference in DIOR across the stocks that belong to the 
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top liquidity shock decile and those in the bottom liquidity shock decile is 0.37 (400% of 
its mean and 11% of its standard deviation). The difference is negative for dedicated 
investors, who, with their low turnover and long investment horizon, can serve as liquidity 
providers. It is insignificant for quasi-indexers, who trade passively following the market. 
Note that transient institutions are the only group in the quarterly data that decreases 
its holdings following negative liquidity shocks (but only for the extreme negative shocks), 
similarly to the results I found for the higher frequency trading.  The other institutions 
increase ownership in all deciles, but the increase in positive liquidity shock deciles is 
larger than the increase in the negative shock ones. The reason for this is, as mentioned 
before, ownership trading variables being on average positive due to the increasing 
institutional ownership in the past decades.  
1.4.2 Double portfolio sorts 
Institutional trading is related to a number of variables and liquidity shocks are 
correlated with many stock characteristics, therefore it is important to introduce a number 
of controls to properly assess the liquidity shocks – institutional trading dynamics. I extend 
this analysis by performing dependent double sorting. First I sort stocks quarterly into 5 
quintiles on the value of one of the control variables at the end of the month (quarter) 
preceding institutional trading. Then, I sort them within those quintiles based on their 
liquidity shock variable into 5 groups. I then calculate the average value of the institutional 
trading variables in the following month (quarter) for all 25 portfolios. The control 
variables used for bivariate sorts are size (LNME), book-to-market ratio (LNBM), 
illiquidity (ILLIQ), analyst forecast dispersion (DISP), number of analysts following the 
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stock from I/B/E/S (Num Est), institutional ownership ratio (IOR) – for 13f data, 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), return (RET), momentum (MOM) and standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE).  
Table 1.5 presents the average institutional trading values for LIQUS portfolios 
averaged across the control groups. This way quintile portfolios have dispersion in liquidity 
shocks and similar levels of control variable. The positive relation between lagged liquidity 
shocks and institutional trading remains significant in bivariate setting. The average 
difference in institutional trading from ANcerno (Panel A) ranges from 0.03% to 0.11%, 
all significant at 1%. Similarly, results are consistent across controls with institutional 
trading proxied by the change in number of institutions (Panel B, PC_NII) with differences 
ranging from 1.15% to 5.3%, change in ownership ratio (Panel C, DIOR) with differences 
from 0.24% to 0.57% and for change in ownership by transient institutions (Panel D, DIOR 
TRANSIENT) with differences from 0.18% to 0.35%.  
Overall, the difference in institutional trading between high and low liquidity shock 
portfolios remains significant (mostly at 1% level) after controlling for a number of stock 
characteristics, further supporting the statement that institutional investors react positively 
to stock-specific liquidity shocks.  
Many of the characteristics controlled for above are also correlated among each 
other (like institutional ownership and size or analyst coverage and illiquidity). Therefore, 
even though the bivariate sorts have the advantage of being a nonparametric tool, it is 
important to control for stock characteristics simultaneously, which I do in the next section 
by employing regression analysis. 
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1.4.3. Cross-sectional regressions 
The next step of the analysis involves cross-sectional regressions of institutional 
trading variables on lagged liquidity shocks and stock characteristics, following the Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) method.  
 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1, (1.9) 
where t+1 is a month when institutional trading takes place and t is a previous month (in 
case of quarterly 13f data: where t+1 is a quarter when institutional trading takes place and 
t is the last month of the preceding quarter). Inst tradingi,t  is measured by net institutional 
trading from ANcerno database as well as change in institutional ownership ratio DIOR, 
DIOR for different Bushee institution types and change in the number of institutional 
shareholders PC_NII. Stock characteristics include size, book-to-market ratio, return, 
momentum, standardized unexpected earnings, dividend yield, volume change, risk 
proxies: idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility shocks, beta, analyst forecast 
dispersion, illiquidity and lagged institutional trading. 
Table 1.6 Panel A presents the regression results where t-statistics are based on 
Newey-West standard errors with 4 lags (both in monthly and quarterly data sets). The 
coefficient for liquidity shock as a predictor of next month institutional trading equals 
0.019 and is significant at 1% level. I interpret the economic significance of the average 
slope coefficient of LIQUS based on institutional trading portfolios. Table 1.4 shows that 
the difference in value of LIQUS for average stocks between highest and lowest deciles is 
25 
 
4.06. Such result implies that positive (negative) liquidity shock of that magnitude results 
in increase (decrease) of the number of institutions holding stock in the magnitude of 168% 
of institutional trading mean and 5% of the variable’s standard deviation.6  
Quarterly data, despite lower frequency, confirm the monthly findings. Liquidity 
shock coefficient in a regression with change in the number of institutional shareholders 
amounts to 0.396 (39% of its mean and 9% of its standard deviation) and is significant at 
1% level. When the change in ownership is used to proxy for institutional trading, the 
coefficient of liquidity shocks is significant at 5% and equals 0.036, implying a 31% of 
mean (3% of standard deviation) change in trading following liquidity shock. The weaker 
significance for DIOR variable as compared with PC_NII supports the claim that change 
in the number of institutions could be a better measure to proxy informed trading of a small 
group of investors.  
Next columns present results for the change in institutional ownership ratio for 
different institutional types. As expected, the relation between liquidity shocks and change 
in institutional ownership is only significant (coefficient equals 0.024) for the transient 
institutions that trade frequently and are short term oriented. The coefficient implies a 
change of 3% of variables standard deviation (105% of its mean).  
Neither dedicated nor the quasi-indexers seem to react to stock liquidity shocks in 
any particular direction, as they trade less frequently and actively and thus are less likely 
to engage in exploiting short term trends.  
                                                 
6 The trading in reaction to liquidity shock constitutes a large proportion of trading variables’ mean due to 
large variation of trading variables. 
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The coefficients for the control variables complement the description of the 
behavior of institutional investors. For example, coefficient on illiquidity is significant and 
negative for ANcerno trading, the overall ownership change and DIOR transient, showing 
preference for more liquid stocks. Even though institutions are said to prefer large 
companies, they increase their ownership in the smaller (negative LNME coefficient) ones, 
consistently with Blume and Keim (2014) observation of overweighing of small stocks and 
underweighting of large stocks in institutional portfolios. Except from dedicated investors, 
institutions are momentum traders, both in the monthly and quarterly regressions. The 
quarterly regressions show especially strong reaction to short-term return of a stock. The 
coefficient for previous month return is negative and less significant for monthly ANcerno 
analysis. Finally, a positive reaction to earnings surprises is only significant in a quarterly 
framework.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that institutions observe stock level liquidity 
changes and trade on them. The positive relation between liquidity shocks and institutional 
trading is robust after controlling for a variety of variables. The relation appears to mainly 
stem from the trading undertaken by transient institutions. The positive sign of the relation 
suggests that institutions exploit the opportunity created by the slow incorporation of 
liquidity shock information into the stock prices and, by doing so, contribute to the price 
adjustment. 
1.4.4 Market wide shock vs. idiosyncratic shock  
To verify whether the reactions of institutional investors to changes in stock 
liquidity are indeed driven by idiosyncratic liquidity shock instead of systematic market 
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liquidity shock, in this section I extract from the liquidity shock, LIQUS, its individual, 
stock related shock portion, as described in section 1.3 Data and variables construction, 
equation (1. 8).   
Table 1.6 Panel B presents the estimates from the regression of different 
institutional trading variables on the individual, non-systematic market related portion of 
the liquidity shock and controls: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑆𝐻𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1, (1.10) 
where INDSHOCK represents liquidity change as related to individual stock 
characteristics.  
The coefficients on INDSHOCK for all main institutional trading variables, both 
for monthly and quarterly data sets, are highly significant and positive. The results for 
individual portion of the liquidity shock are stronger than the estimates from regression 
using LIQUS variable for quarterly data, which suggests that the source of institutional 
reactions lies in individually generated stock liquidity shocks. Systematic market liquidity 
shock plays little role in the reactions captured in my results. In fact, the average R2 from 
the equation (1.8) regression equals 9.7%, pointing to relatively low relation between 
LIQUS and market wide liquidity shocks. 
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1.4.5 Liquidity shock driven trades and future returns 
The evidence in the previous sections supports that institutions trade on liquidity 
shocks in the direction that allow them to exploit the mispricing arising from the slow 
return adjustment to liquidity shocks as shown in BPST (2014). In this section, I further 
study the economic importance of this trading activity from an asset pricing perspective.  
First, I replicate the main analysis in BPST (2014) in this study’s sample period. I 
find the long-short portfolios sorted on liquidity shocks generate significant monthly 
returns of 1.06% in the entire stock universe, 0.69% in 13f database, and 1.01% in ANcerno 
database in this sample period. The ANcerno stock universe presents a similar magnitude 
of the return effect as the wider stock universe. This suggests that the post liquidity shock 
drift in the ANcerno stock universe is economically more important than that in the entire 
stock universe, due to being effectively tradable by large institutions. 
I then directly test the future returns of institutions’ liquidity shock driven trades. 
Table 1.7 presents the results of a two stage analysis. The first stage regression is a baseline 
regression of institutional trading variable on lagged liquidity shocks (see equation (1.9)). 
Based on the 1st stage regression results I construct a Predicted trading variable 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 (1.11) 
The second stage regression is a Fama-MacBeth regression of future returns on Predicted 
trading and controls 
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 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡+1 (1.12) 
The coefficient on Predicted trading equals 5.276 and is highly significant. This 
means that institutional trading predicted by LIQUS differential between high and low 
liquidity shock decile generates a 0.407% return per month and 5.03% per year.7 This result 
shows that attentive and sophisticated institutional investors who trade on monthly shocks 
to liquidity, earn significant profit from the post shock drift in return. Remarkably, the 
monthly return of 0.407% accounts for half of the liquidity shock driven returns, both in 
my replication and as reported by BPST (2014) (0.7%-1.2% return per month, translating 
to 9%-15% return per year).  
Overall, the results of univariate and bivariate sorts, multivariate regressions, and 
profitability tests show the positive significant relation between institutional trading and 
liquidity shocks is economically and statistically significant, and consistent across two data 
sets: one using institutional trading in a monthly frequency based on direct trading data 
from ANcerno and spanning 11 years and the other one inferring institutional trading from 
quarterly holding changes and spanning 31 years. In the quarterly data, transient 
institutions are the main driver of the relation as the most active traders.  
 
                                                 




1.5 Additional analysis 
In this section, I perform additional analysis on the reactions of institutional trading 
to liquidity shocks to understand their robustness and highlight their significance by 
looking into subsamples of stocks, subperiods with potentially different economic 
conditions, and alternative definition of subcategory of funds. Henceforth, I will 
concentrate on the monthly data set due to its higher precision. Quarterly analysis based on 
inference and not direct trading data makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions.  
1.5.1 Stock Characteristics 
To better understand the liquidity shock-institutional trading dynamics, I introduce 
into the cross-sectional regressions interactions between liquidity shock and some control 
variables. To make the interpretation of the coefficients meaningful, the liquidity and 
control variables are centered, with the exception of SUE for which value zero has 
meaningful interpretation. Because of centering, the coefficient on liquidity shock variable 
is the effect of liquidity shock on institutional trading for average values of a control 
variable (e.g. size).  
Table 1.8 presents the results. As in previous specifications, the coefficient on 
liquidity shock is positive and significant in all specifications and varies from 0.015 to 
0.021. The interaction between liquidity shock and size (LNME) is negative and 
significant, implying that the shock induced trading is more pronounced for smaller stocks, 
likely because the shocks are more quickly incorporated into prices in larger stocks. The 
institutional reaction to liquidity shocks is stronger following negative returns. Coefficient 
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for interaction term of liquidity shock and illiquidity is significantly negative, indicating 
stronger reaction for liquid stocks.  
In unreported results of double sorting one of the firm characteristics and liquidity 
shock, I further find the reaction is mostly significant in small and medium size stocks. The 
high-low liquidity shock differential in institutional trading is the highest in small stocks 
with lower analyst following, high volatility and medium liquidity – stocks that are less 
visible but still tradable. In those stocks the post liquidity shock return drift is likely more 
persistent and hence they present a better opportunity for institutions to trade on it.  Taken 
together, the results suggest that institutional reaction is concentrated in stocks with higher 
chance of mispricing but that are still liquid and thus easier to trade.  
1.5.2 Positive vs. Negative Shocks 
In this section, I investigate whether there is an asymmetry in the liquidity shock – 
institutional trading relation. I have so far established a positive reaction of institutions to 
individual stock liquidity shocks. In Table 1.9 I break down the LIQUS variable into its 
positive and negative portion. 66% of LIQUS observations are positive. The results 
indicate that the reaction to liquidity shocks is a symmetrical one; institutions react 
positively to both positive and negative liquidity shocks. This implies that they buy stock 
following its positive shock and sell it after the sudden liquidity decrease.  
1.5.3 Market-wide liquidity shocks 
I examine whether there is a difference between investor reaction to liquidity 
shocks when their trading coincides with positive and negative shocks to market overall 
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liquidity. During periods of liquidity dry-ups investors can either trade less on individual 
shocks due to funding liquidity troubles or the opposite – market-wide liquidity issues can 
turn their attention towards their stock investment, which naturally increases their attention 
on liquidity changes of individual stocks. I perform the regression analysis for the times of 
positive and negative market-wide liquidity shocks at the time of institutional trading. I 
construct market illiquidity measure (MILLIQ) as in equation (1.5) and a monthly 
systematic market liquidity shock (MLIQUS) as in equation (1.6).  
Table 1.10, Column 1 displays Fama-MacBeth regressions for periods of 
systematic market liquidity deterioration and periods of overall liquidity improvement in 
the market. The positive trading reaction of institutions to liquidity shocks is significant 
and similar during positive and negative market shocks periods, indicating consistent 
investor behavior. The results support my earlier analysis that the institutional trading 
effect documented in this paper is mainly driven by stock-level liquidity shocks.  
1.5.4 NBER economic cycles 
I also perform the regression analysis for contractions and expansions coinciding 
with individual liquidity shocks, as defined by NBER. The subsample of contractions 
consists of 31 periods (months) and expansions – 121 periods. According to NBER a 
recession is a period of falling economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more 
than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial 
production, and wholesale-retail sales.8   
                                                 
8 Announcement from the NBER's Business Cycle Dating Committee, dated 9/20/10. 
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Table 1.10 Column 2 presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions for two 
subgroups. The coefficient on liquidity shocks is significantly higher in times of economic 
expansion (t statistic for the coefficient difference is 7.32). Since institutional trading 
decisions in crisis times are likely related to other concerns such as funding (for example 
sudden redemptions), as argued by Franzoni and Plazzi (2013), it is not surprising to see a 
stronger relation in times of economic prosperity. 
1.5.5 Levels of VIX 
In this section, I also investigate different market volatility conditions as defined 
by VIX (CBOE Volatility Index). VIX is a measure of implied volatility of S&P 500 index 
options and is considered a general proxy of market uncertainty.  
I divide the sample into two groups – “high VIX” are all months above the median 
monthly VIX for the sample period and “low VIX” are the months below the median. The 
regression result in Table 1.10 column 3 suggests that there is no significant difference in 
coefficients between periods of high and low VIX. 
1.5.6 Early vs. Later Periods 
Liquidity tends to fluctuate over time (see Figure 1.1), thus I complement my 
analysis with examining the liquidity shock – institutional trading relation in the first and 




Table 1.10 Column 4 presents estimates of the Fama-MacBeth regressions. The 
reaction results are significant in both subperiods, confirming the robustness of the liquidity 
shock – institutional trading relation. Magnitude of the coefficient on liquidity shocks 
decreases slightly yet significantly over time, however remains highly significant.  
1.5.7 ANcerno client type 
I also examine the results of the regression of institutional trading on liquidity 
shocks for different types of ANcerno clients.  
Table 1.11 shows the regression estimates for different client groups in ANcerno 
data set. The coefficient on liquidity shocks are predictors of institutional trading is 3 times 
larger for money managers thank for pension plan sponsors and the difference is highly 
significant. This supports the claim that managers tend to trade in a more informed and 
attentive manner as opposed to pension plans. 
 
1.6 Feedback effects of institutional trading on liquidity shocks 
To complement my earlier cross-sectional analysis, in this section, I perform a 
Panel VAR analysis to investigate how liquidity shocks, institutional trading, and stock 
returns are mutually related to each other in the time series. This analysis particularly 
addresses whether there is a feedback effect from institutional trading to liquidity shocks. 
That is, instead of simply trading to exploit liquidity shock induced mispricing, whether 
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institutional reactions have further implications on future liquidity shocks to individual 
stocks.   
I directly account for relations between returns, liquidity shocks and institutional 
trading, without making assumptions on causality, by using panel vector autoregression 
(VAR) with fixed effects. I address the complexity of the dynamic relations between those 
variables by using additional lags. 
Following Hendershott, Livdan and Schürhoff (2014) and Holtz-Eakin, Newey and 
Rosen (1988) for each stock i and month t I create a 3x1 vector yit = (Institutional Tradingit, 
Returnit, LIQUSit)’ and specify following system of equations: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆
𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1 , (1.13) 
where αi is a 3x1 vector of firm specific intercepts, λi, l = 1, …, L, are 3x3 coefficient 
matrices, and εit is a 3x1 vector of innovations. Components of vector yit are jointly 
endogenously determined and autocorrelated. Because αi varies across firms and variance 
of innovations is heteroskedastic, one does not need to assume that relation between those 
three variables is the same for every firm. It is assumed that the error term satisfies 
following characteristics; E(eit)=0, E(e’iteit)=Σ and E(e’iteis)=0 for all t>s. Because of use 
of lags of dependent variables, fixed effects αi are correlated with the regressors. To 
eliminate estimation bias, I apply the forward orthogonal deviations transformation 
(Helmert transform) as in Arellano and Bover (1995). The model is estimated as a system 
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of GMM equations (which produces consistent estimates) using lagged regressors as 
instruments following Love and Zicchino (2006).9 
Table 1.12 reports the estimates of the panel VAR regressions. Panel A uses Exret 
– raw return less the risk free rate as the measure of return. In Panel B I present the results 
with four factor alpha based on Fama-French (1993) three factor model with Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor. The results are consistent with the cross-sectional regressions presented 
before. Trading is positively related to past liquidity shocks (middle column). The 
magnitude of the coefficient on the shock in month t-1 is very close to that shown in the 
Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions.10 The coefficient on the shock in month t-2 is 
even larger (more than twice larger). Institutions also chase past positive returns (middle 
column, institutional trading regressed on returns).  
The particular interest is in the first column, in which liquidity shocks are regressed 
on past trading. The coefficient estimates are positive and significant (especially for the 
first two lags), indicating that indeed there is a feedback from trading to liquidity shocks, 
such that institutional buying makes shocks more positive and selling – more negative. A 
possible channel for this impact is that institutions buy stocks using more limit orders on 
average and hence act as liquidity providers. When they sell stocks, they may be under 
greater pressure to complete transaction, use market orders and thus consume liquidity. 
The results also show institutional trading negatively predicts future returns (third 
column), leading to an annualized negative 1.01% return, which suggests that holding 
                                                 
9 I thank Inessa Love from World Bank for providing the PVAR Stata code.  
10 PVAR estimates are multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes. Coefficient of trading regressed on liqus 
(t-1) is 0.019 (2.244) as compared to 0.019 (8.93) from Table 6 Panel A. 
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everything else constant, the temporary price pressure from institutional buying and selling 
is nontrivial.11 The results suggest that unconditional average monthly institutional trading 
demands liquidity. Such demand introduces temporary price pressure that reverts in the 
future. The results are in stark contrast to the positive return predictability of institutional 
trading conditional on liquidity shocks in Table 1.7, thus highlighting the informativeness 
of institutional trading on liquidity shocks.   
I also illustrate the dynamic relations between returns, institutional trading and 
liquidity shocks with the impulse response functions. Orthogonalized IRFs are based on 
Cholesky decomposition. The standard errors for the impulse-response functions are 
calculated by using Monte Carlo simulations with 500 repetitions and present 5% 
confidence bounds on the graphs. Figure 1.3 shows IRF assuming following ordering of 
dependent variables: liquidity shocks, excess returns, institutional trading. First column 
shows reactions to liquidity shock, second- to return shock and the third – to trading shock. 
Top right graphs shows that the positive reaction of liquidity shock to institutional trading 
peaks in two months. Also the institutional trading on past liquidity shocks is the most 
pronounced in the second month (bottom left graph). Institutional trading on past returns 
is short lived (bottom middle graph), as is institutional trading persistence (bottom right 
graph).12  
Overall I find supporting evidence that institutions not only exploit the information 
from past liquidity shocks, their very trading also further amplify liquidity risk. Thus, 
                                                 
11 Coefficient*main regression Table 1.6 coefficient*LIQUS differential (-1.09)*0.019*4.06=-0.084% per 
month and -1.01% per year. 
12 IRFs with alternative orderings (under alternative assumptions regarding contemporaneous relations) 
result in similar conclusions. 
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despite the positive impact on price efficiency, institutional trading introduces a 
destabilizing effect on future stock liquidity. 
 
1.7 Conclusion and further questions 
How institutions trade and react to market liquidity is an important aspect of 
understanding the role that institutional investors and market liquidity jointly play in the 
process of achieving efficient market. In this paper, I investigate the pattern of institutions’ 
trading following stock-level market liquidity shocks, which are much less likely to be 
entangled with the confounding effects that would come with systematic market liquidity 
shocks. This study intends to shed light on institutional investors' sophistication in response 
to market liquidity shocks and the impact of institutional trading on market efficiency and 
liquidity, as well as the importance of heterogeneity of institutional trading styles in the 
institutional trading liquidity dynamics.  
This study shows that institutions, especially the transient ones, buy stocks that 
experience positive liquidity shocks and sell those that experience negative ones. Changes 
in ownership induced by the high-low liquidity shocks positively predict 5.03% annualized 
return in the subsequent month. This trading activity further amplifies the liquidity shocks 
through feedback effects. Overall, the findings support that institutional investors are 
attentive and sophisticated when experiencing liquidity shocks. They contribute to market 
efficiency by reducing mispricing. On the one hand, institutions, particularly the active 
ones, play a positive role in helping bring price back to efficient levels following liquidity 
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shocks. On the other hand, there is a feedback effect of the trading to future liquidity which 





Table 1.1 Comparison of stocks in 13f and ANcerno datasets. 
The first table summarizes yearly number of stocks traded by institutions. The second table 
compares the characteristics of the stocks included in the time-matched (January 1999-
September 2011) ANcerno and 13f datasets. ILLIQ is Amihud illiquidity factor, LIQUS is 
liquidity shock, INDSHOCK and MKTSHOCK are results of partitioning LIQUS into 
individual and market liquidity shock-related portions, BETA is market Beta, LNME is 
natural logarithm of firm’s market value, LNBM is natural logarithm of stock’s book-to-
market ratio, MOM is 11-month momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, DISP is 
analyst forecast dispersion, NUMEST is number of analysts’ forecasts, SUE is 
standardized unexpected earnings. 
Number of stocks 
Year ANcerno 13f 
1999 4781 4722 
2000 4178 4667 
2001 3770 3776 
2002 3437 3562 
2003 3829 3493 
2004 3737 3743 
2005 3768 3736 
2006 3769 3741 
2007 3629 3711 
2008 3183 3419 
2009 3009 2881 
2010 3028 2952 
2011 2604 2970 
 
 ANcerno 13f   
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. difference t stat 
illiq 0.13 0.65 0.26 1.10 0.12 41.68 
liqus 0.10 1.45 0.14 1.31 0.05 12.26 
beta 1.26 1.01 1.24 1.01 -0.02 -5.92 
lnme 6.65 1.66 6.47 1.74 -0.18 -36.22 
lnbm -0.78 0.86 -0.76 0.86 0.02 9.21 
mom 21.61 72.80 21.44 76.19 -0.17 -0.78 
ivol 2.24 1.48 2.24 1.51 -0.01 -1.37 
disp 0.09 0.26 0.09 0.24 -0.01 -8.07 
numest 7.97 6.57 7.77 6.57 -0.20 -9.86 







Table 1.2 Summary statistics 
The table presents summary characteristics. Panel A summarizes sample from ANcerno (monthly data) and Panel B from Thompson-
Reuters 13f dataset (quarterly data). ILLIQ is Amihud illiquidity factor, LIQUS is liquidity shock, INDSHOCK and MKTSHOCK are 
results of partitioning LIQUS into individual and market liquidity shock-related portions, BETA is market Beta, LNME is natural 
logarithm of firm’s market value, LNBM is natural logarithm of stock’s book-to-market ratio, RET is the stock return in the month 
preceding trading quarter, MOM is 11-month momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, IVOLU are shocks to IVOL, DISP is analyst 
forecast dispersion, NUMEST is number of analysts’ forecasts,  SUE is standardized unexpected earnings, DY is quarterly dividend 
yield,  ANcerno trading is the net monthly trading activity of institutions in ANcerno in %, IOR is the institutional ownership ratio from 
13f in %. DIOR is change in IOR variable within a quarter and DIOR for specific investors types refer to changes in IOR variables for 
those types, INST OWNERS is the number of institutional investors holding company’s stock from 13f, PC_NII is the change in the 
number of institutional shareholders within a quarter scaled by the lagged number of institutional holders in %. 
Panel A ANcerno dataset 
Variable  N  Mean 10thPctl  Median  90thPctl StdDev Skewness Kurtosis 
illiq 450,204  0.134 0.000 0.006 0.214 0.646 17.134 505.896 
liqus 450,204  0.096 -1.661 0.475 1.383 1.449 -2.351 11.150 
mktshock 401,335  -0.046 -0.710 0.027 0.513 0.621 -2.030 10.874 
indshock 401,335  0.066 -1.544 0.261 1.437 1.334 -1.385 5.190 
beta 428,808  1.256 0.226 1.063 2.537 1.012 1.577 6.158 
lnme 450,204  6.651 4.669 6.464 8.927 1.662 0.565 0.221 
lnbm 438,253  -0.783 -1.850 -0.700 0.161 0.858 -0.759 2.784 
ret 450,204  1.750 -13.509 0.833 17.210 14.517 1.387 9.796 
mom 450,188  21.613 -37.077 8.702 82.194 72.803 4.731 45.062 
ivol 450,204  2.245 0.859 1.848 4.141 1.476 1.897 5.516 
ivolu 450,204  -0.087 -1.210 -0.183 1.118 1.098 1.174 5.491 
disp 450,204  0.091 0.000 0.023 0.185 0.258 7.138 70.208 
numest 406,008  7.973 1.000 6.000 17.000 6.575 1.399 2.038 
sue 397,272  -0.023 -1.464 -0.006 1.392 1.038 -0.084 -0.410 







Panel B 13f Thomson-Reuters dataset 
Variable  N  Mean 10thPctl  Median  90thPctl StdDev Skewness Kurtosis 
illiq 383,016  0.516 0.001 0.028 1.167 1.692 7.131 78.718 
liqus 383,016  0.079 -1.609 0.439 1.296 1.349 -2.003 6.717 
mktshock 313,962  0.003 -0.348 0.006 0.374 0.425 -1.034 13.286 
indshock 313,962  0.089 -1.513 0.309 1.404 1.293 -1.341 3.921 
beta 357,204  1.284 0.307 1.146 2.397 0.941 1.614 8.741 
lnme 383,016  5.937 3.769 5.777 8.305 1.768 0.493 0.055 
lnbm 365,072  -0.665 -1.722 -0.577 0.270 0.846 -0.837 2.885 
ret 383,016  1.783 -11.667 0.962 15.746 12.396 1.076 7.266 
mom 382,989  21.150 -32.203 10.760 77.931 62.031 4.709 54.992 
ivol 382,980  2.173 0.868 1.829 3.917 1.348 1.786 5.185 
ivolu 382,890  -0.090 -1.082 -0.165 0.960 0.963 1.094 5.687 
disp 383,016  0.095 0.000 0.025 0.198 0.260 6.862 66.302 
numest 326,846  8.085 1.000 6.000 19.000 7.286 1.494 2.164 
sue 295,491  -0.028 -1.477 -0.007 1.393 1.044 -0.092 -0.443 
IOR 383,016  44.984 9.266 43.031 84.054 27.316 0.228 -0.998 
DIOR 383,016  0.466 -4.550 0.264 5.685 4.980 0.108 4.689 
DIOR QUIX 383,016  0.335 -3.573 0.217 4.380 3.761 -0.061 5.177 
DIOR DED 383,016  0.028 -1.494 0.000 1.591 1.859 0.103 7.828 
DIOR TRANS 383,016  0.093 -3.131 0.000 3.414 3.294 0.137 5.793 
DIOR OTHER 383,016  -0.012 -0.240 0.000 0.196 0.782 -0.361 58.194 
INSTOWNERS 383,016  101.741 9.000 55.000 241.000 140.399 3.722 20.858 







Table 1.3 Correlation matrix 
The table presents the time-series average of cross-sectional Pearson correlation matrix. The correlation values are multiplied by 100. 
ILLIQ is Amihud illiquidity factor, LIQUS is liquidity shock, INDSHOCK and MKTSHOCK are results of partitioning LIQUS into 
individual and market liquidity shock-related portions, BETA is market Beta, LNME is natural logarithm of firm’s market value, LNBM 
is natural logarithm of stock’s book-to-market ratio, RET is the stock return in the month preceding trading quarter, MOM is 11-month 
momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, IVOLU are shocks to IVOL,  DISP is analyst forecast dispersion, SUE is standardized 
unexpected earnings, DY is quarterly dividend yield, DIOR is change in IOR variable within a quarter in % and DIOR for specific 
investors types refer to changes in IOR variables for those types, PC_NII is the change in the number of institutional shareholders within 
a quarter scaled by the lagged number of institutional holders. 
Panel A ANcerno dataset 





beta lnme lnbm  ret  mom ivol ivolu disp sue 
ANcerno 
trading 
illiq 100.00              
liqus -19.53 100.00             
mkt shock -1.96 13.17 100.00            
ind shock -6.29 88.78 -7.34 100.00           
beta -7.38 -3.93 8.65 -0.58 100.00          
lnme -39.24 14.10 -1.05 -3.95 -9.10 100.00         
lnbm 16.87 0.10 4.64 7.77 -10.56 -25.60 100.00        
ret 0.24 2.41 0.41 2.22 -0.56 -1.34 1.98 100.00       
mom -5.66 32.89 13.87 28.17 5.46 2.81 2.60 1.53 100.00      
ivol 12.45 -8.42 4.02 -0.01 34.24 -33.57 -7.07 -1.51 8.47 100.00     
ivolu 2.95 -7.24 -4.90 -7.42 -8.15 2.39 0.62 -0.45 -8.52 59.49 100.00    
disp -5.24 -5.31 1.69 -2.58 15.86 -4.47 2.02 -1.06 -6.86 13.85 -0.67 100.00   
sue -0.92 13.27 5.16 11.66 -0.71 3.78 3.47 2.23 22.07 0.45 -0.50 -3.46 100.00  







Panel B 13f Thomson-Reuters dataset 
  
 















illiq 100.00                   
liqus -25.99 100.00                  
mkt shock -2.58 10.08 100.00                 
ind shock -11.91 90.80 -5.93 100.00                
beta -3.57 -3.14 2.77 -0.46 100.00               
lnme -43.02 12.39 0.39 -5.36 -13.18 100.00              
lnbm 11.58 1.33 2.31 8.41 -17.47 -16.39 100.00             
ret -1.89 14.49 0.87 14.99 -0.73 0.59 2.98 100.00            
mom -7.52 28.75 8.04 24.57 4.61 4.30 -0.51 3.34 100.00           
ivol 26.76 -11.42 1.12 -1.06 31.99 -41.72 -12.78 10.76 0.73 100.00          
ivolu 6.68 -11.36 -3.48 -10.22 -6.83 1.74 -0.16 10.06 -12.19 56.67 100.00         
disp -6.13 -5.35 0.50 -3.04 11.00 -0.55 3.76 -1.57 -11.29 11.09 0.04 100.00        
sue -1.03 13.26 3.41 12.53 -1.01 2.95 3.67 6.25 25.23 -1.49 -2.80 -4.99 100.00       
DIOR -0.97 3.97 1.44 4.08 1.47 -2.19 0.38 8.12 7.00 0.08 -4.01 -0.35 1.72 100.00      
DIOR quix -1.41 2.65 0.52 1.61 1.69 0.00 -2.85 0.90 6.73 -0.20 -2.81 -1.60 1.42 60.97 100.00     
DIOR ded 0.12 -0.60 -0.01 -0.87 0.62 -0.72 -0.77 -1.25 -0.95 -0.20 -0.91 -0.12 -1.55 27.46 -4.25 100.00    
DIOR trans -0.35 3.22 1.30 4.59 -0.47 -1.85 4.34 11.61 3.10 -0.43 -2.28 1.43 1.75 50.50 -6.80 -8.43 100.00   
DIOR other 0.57 0.55 0.17 0.99 -0.07 -0.54 -0.07 -0.20 -0.20 0.37 0.44 -0.15 0.02 7.42 -3.26 -1.77 -1.87 100.00  







Table 1.4 Liquidity shocks univariate portfolio sorts 
Institutional trading for portfolios formed based on lagged liquidity shocks. Stocks listed on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq are sorted in the 
last month preceding the institutional trading month (quarter) into 10 decile portfolios based on liquidity shock measure LIQUS. The 
table reports average values of institutional trading measures: monthly ANcerno trading data and quarterly 13f data: PC_NII - the change 
in the number of institutional shareholders within a quarter scaled by the lagged number of institutional holders, DIOR - change in IOR 
variable within a quarter and DIOR for specific investors types; TRANS – transient, DED – dedicated and QUIX – quasi indexers, as 
defined by Bushee (2001).  The last row reports the difference in institutional trading between high (positive shock) and low (negative 
shock) liquidity shock portfolios. T statistics are reported in parentheses. The table reports average decile characteristics of LIQUS in 
both samples. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 














  1           -0.04           -2.39            2.06            0.07           -0.06            0.03            0.09           -0.02           -2.44 
  (-3.34)   (4.34) (0.61) (-0.81) (1.57) (1) (-0.88)   
  2               0           -0.97             2.6            0.29            0.01            0.05            0.21           -0.01           -0.91 
  (-0.14)   (5.83) (2.38) (0.17) (2.78) (2.22) (-0.53)   
  3            0.01           -0.46            3.12            0.28            0.01            0.05            0.22           -0.01           -0.41 
  (0.64)   (6.58) (2.28) (0.12) (2.37) (2.39) (-0.18)   
  4            0.04           -0.11            3.52            0.38            0.04            0.03            0.31           -0.01           -0.07 
  (3.17)   (7.64) (3.16) (0.53) (1.76) (3.27) (-0.26)   
  5            0.04            0.16            4.18            0.46            0.01            0.05            0.37           -0.01            0.19 
  (3.81)   (8.7) (3.71) (0.17) (2.67) (3.9) (-0.33)   
  6            0.07             0.4            4.81             0.5            0.08            0.04            0.39           -0.01            0.42 
  (6.46)   (9.76) (3.97) (1) (2.38) (4.01) (-0.49)   
  7            0.09            0.63            5.54            0.64            0.14            0.03            0.48           -0.01            0.63 
  (8.52)   (11.27) (5.12) (1.84) (1.48) (5.05) (-0.56)   
  8            0.09            0.86            5.67            0.68            0.21            0.02            0.43               0            0.86 
  (8.48)   (11.77) (5.47) (2.79) (0.84) (4.44) (-0.09)   
  9            0.08            1.14            5.82            0.69            0.26               0             0.4           -0.01            1.12 
  (8.1)   (12.19) (5.46) (3.29) (-0.17) (4.15) (-0.18)   
 10            0.04            1.67            4.96            0.56            0.31           -0.02            0.23               0            1.62 
  (3.57)   (11.38) (4.19) (3.96) (-0.85) (2.31) (0.03)   
H-L         0.07***            2.9***         0.48***         0.37***        -0.05***         0.16         0.02   




Table 1.5 Bivariate portfolio sorts 
Stocks listed on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq are sorted in the last month preceding the institutional 
trading month – in ANcerno data (quarter, in 13f data) into 5 quintile portfolios based on control 
variables and then into five portfolios based on liquidity shock measure LIQUS. The table reports 
average values of monthly ANcerno trading and quarterly PC_NII, DIOR and DIOR_TRANS 
averaged across the control groups so that there are quintile portfolios with dispersion in liquidity 
shocks and with similar levels of control variable. The (H-L) row reports the difference in 
institutional trading between high (positive shock) and low (negative shock) liquidity shock 
portfolios. LNME is natural logarithm of firm’s market value, LNBM is natural logarithm of 
stock’s book-to-market ratio, RET is the stock return in the month preceding trading quarter, MOM 
is 11-month momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, DISP is analyst forecast dispersion, 
NUMEST is number of analysts’ forecasts, ILLIQ is Amihud (2002) monthly illiquidity, IOR is 
institutional ownership ratio, SUE is standardized unexpected earnings. T statistics are reported in 
parentheses.   * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
PANEL A ANcerno trading 
liq shock 
rank 
lnme lnbm mom ret ivol disp numest illiq sue 
1 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
(-2.54) (-2.33) (1.42) (-1.58) (-2.44) (-2.29) (-2.2) (-2.91) (-2) 
2 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
  (1.57) (2.06) (5.1) (2.57) (1.95) (2.21) (1.73) (1.19) (2.15) 
3 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 
  (5.26) (6.26) (6) (5.79) (5.24) (6.17) (6.18) (4.98) (6.38) 
4 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 
  (9.77) (10.14) (7.55) (9.61) (9.82) (8.99) (10.16) (8.6) (9.42) 
5 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 
(8.77) (7.37) (4.9) (7.23) (8.33) (8.07) (7.86) (10.04) (7.08) 
H-L 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 
  (8.82) (7.92) (4.06) (7.95) (9.73) (8.45) (8.15) (10.23) (7.83) 
 
Panel B PC_NII 
liq shock 
rank 
lnme lnbm mom ret ivol disp numest illiq ior sue 
  1 2.01 2.38 3.32 2.7 2.31 2.36 2.19 1.52 2.18 2.35 
(4.61) (5.2) (7.16) (5.81) (5.11) (5.19) (4.89) (3.71) (4.95) (5.16) 
  2 2.99 3.34 4.12 3.72 3.22 3.24 3.27 2.53 3.28 3.33 
  (6.6) (7.14) (8.86) (8.09) (7.09) (7.11) (7.1) (6.01) (7.06) (7.15) 
  3 4.17 4.57 4.58 4.73 4.39 4.38 4.38 3.64 4.42 4.48 
  (8.84) (9.63) (9.77) (9.77) (9.35) (9.33) (9.46) (8.25) (9.44) (9.43) 
  4 5.47 5.55 4.82 5.17 5.43 5.57 5.62 5.34 5.69 5.57 
  (11.65) (11.74) (10.4) (11.42) (11.19) (11.74) (11.85) (10.91) (11.81) (11.69) 
  5 6.21 5.41 4.47 4.86 5.71 5.68 5.79 6.82 5.58 5.44 
(12.57) (12.04) (10.42) (10.93) (12.35) (12.12) (12.1) (12.7) (11.83) (12.07) 
H-L 4.21*** 3.03*** 1.15*** 2.16*** 3.4*** 3.32*** 3.59*** 5.3*** 3.4*** 3.09*** 






PANEL C DIOR 
liq  shock 
rank 
lnme lnbm mom ret ivol disp numest illiq ior sue 
1 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.17 
(1.42) (1.46) (2.33) (1.99) (1.61) (1.49) (1.38) (1.24) (1.69) (1.44) 
2 0.31 0.34 0.44 0.4 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.27 0.35 0.34 
  (2.54) (2.8) (3.66) (3.23) (2.74) (2.83) (2.7) (2.17) (2.83) (2.83) 
3 0.43 0.48 0.5 0.51 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.38 0.47 0.48 
  (3.49) (3.88) (4) (4.13) (3.66) (3.79) (3.88) (3.05) (3.83) (3.83) 
4 0.62 0.65 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.65 
  (5.1) (5.31) (4.6) (4.87) (4.92) (5.22) (5.31) (5.06) (5.3) (5.25) 
5 0.71 0.64 0.51 0.55 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.72 0.61 0.64 
(5.75) (5.01) (4.12) (4.25) (5.26) (5.11) (5.31) (6.12) (4.79) (5.06) 
H-L 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.24*** 0.31*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.5*** 0.57*** 0.4*** 0.47*** 
  (12.97) (10.58) (6.2) (7.16) (10.57) (10.56) (11.69) (13.25) (8.63) (10.39) 
 
PANEL D DIOR TRANS 
liq shock 
rank 
lnme lnbm mom ret ivol disp numest illiq ior sue 
1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
(-0.46) (-0.41) (-0.33) (0.16) (-0.26) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.63) (-0.29) (-0.46) 
2 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 
  (-0.14) (0.25) (0.42) (1.04) (0.29) (0.24) (0.26) (-0.44) (0.31) (0.36) 
3 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.06 
  (0.36) (0.7) (1.35) (0.99) (0.49) (0.47) (0.39) (-0.08) (0.66) (0.76) 
4 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.16 
  (2.07) (2.33) (2.07) (1.86) (2.05) (2.39) (2.49) (1.97) (2.34) (2.24) 
5 0.32 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.28 
(4.14) (3.7) (3.18) (2.41) (3.71) (3.75) (3.73) (4.24) (3.4) (3.53) 
H-L 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 






Table 1.6 Cross-sectional regressions for different institutional trading measures. 
The table presents the results of a stock-level Fama and MacBeth (1973) type regression of institutional trading variable on lagged 
liquidity shocks and controls. In Panel A, the regression is specified as 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1 
and lagged liquidity shocks are measured by LIQUS. 
In Panel B, the regression is specified as 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑆𝐻𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1 . I extract from the liquidity 
shock its individual, stock-related shock (INDSHOCK). T+1 is a month when institutional trading takes place and t is a previous month 
(in case of quarterly 13f data: where t+1 is a quarter when institutional trading takes place and t is the last month of the preceding 
quarter). Inst tradingi,t  is measured by net institutional trading from ANcerno database as well as change in institutional ownership ratio 
from 13f - DIOR for different Bushee institution types and change in the number of institutional shareholders PC_NII. Stock 
characteristics: BETA is market Beta, LNME is natural logarithm of firm’s market value, LNBM is natural logarithm of stock’s book-
to-market ratio, MOM is 11-month momentum, RET is the stock return in the previous month (in the last month of preceding quarter),  
IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, IVOLU are shocks to IVOL, DISP is analyst forecast dispersion, SUE is standardized unexpected 
earnings, DY is quarterly dividend yield, lag trading is the previous month (quarter) value of the trading variable. T statistics are based 







Panel A Liquidity shock measured by LIQUS 
 ANcerno trading PC_NII DIOR DIOR TRANS DIOR DED DIOR QUIX DIOR OTHER 
liqus 0.019 0.396 0.036 0.024 -0.004 0.012 0.001 
 (8.93)*** (7.59)*** (2.42)** (2.89)*** (0.92) (1.11) (0.31) 
lnme -0.012 -0.984 -0.100 -0.034 -0.012 -0.041 0.022 
 (3.99)*** (5.38)*** (5.37)*** (3.06)*** (1.82)* (2.51)** (2.98)*** 
lnbm -0.011 -0.286 0.039 0.153 -0.014 -0.123 -0.003 
 (2.73)*** (2.60)** (1.17) (6.42)*** (1.51) (6.51)*** (0.90) 
mom 0.001 0.053 0.008 0.002 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 
 (6.88)*** (14.57)*** (10.56)*** (3.85)*** (1.78)* (11.85)*** (2.50)** 
ret -0.001 0.219 0.039 0.036 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.80)* (28.18)*** (13.03)*** (15.71)*** (3.10)*** (0.11) (2.19)** 
sue 0.002 0.529 -0.010 0.012 -0.017 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.56) (11.79)*** (0.92) (1.59) (4.36)*** (0.78) (0.81) 
dy 0.365 -3.714 -3.072 -0.987 -1.232 -0.608 -0.439 
 (0.82) (0.57) (2.39)** (0.90) (2.19)** (0.56) (1.71)* 
ivol 0.013 0.022 -0.045 -0.025 -0.003 -0.018 0.009 
 (2.66)*** (0.27) (1.41) (1.42) (0.38) (0.75) (1.99)** 
ivolu -0.004 -0.668 -0.178 -0.069 -0.013 -0.056 -0.005 
 (0.65) (6.78)*** (5.40)*** (2.76)*** (1.28) (2.59)** (1.47) 
beta 0.008 -0.143 0.087 0.004 0.021 0.056 -0.000 
 (1.63) (0.92) (2.18)** (0.15) (1.43) (3.10)*** (0.01) 
disp 0.005 -0.913 0.054 0.264 -0.043 -0.178 -0.001 
 (0.36) (4.17)*** (0.78) (5.56)*** (2.01)** (3.98)*** (0.13) 
illiq -0.025 0.281 -0.115 -0.044 -0.013 -0.062 0.007 
 (2.71)*** (2.27)** (3.25)*** (2.19)** (2.42)** (2.92)*** (1.82)* 
lag trading 0.224 -0.062 -0.146 -0.026 0.020 -0.084 -0.374 
 (45.12)*** (7.02)*** (17.43)*** (2.92)*** (1.47) (6.49)*** (16.07)*** 
_cons 0.044 8.031 0.923 0.366 0.102 0.368 -0.115 
 (1.68)* (6.07)*** (6.52)*** (3.78)*** (2.32)** (2.62)*** (2.66)*** 
R2 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.18 








Panel B Individual stock–related portion extracted from LIQUS 
 
 ANcerno trading PC_NII DIOR DIOR TRANS DIOR DED DIOR QUIX DIOR OTHER 
indshock 0.015 0.363 0.048 0.052 -0.008 -0.002 -0.000 
 (6.46)*** (8.32)*** (3.33)*** (6.51)*** (2.22)** (0.16) (0.27) 
lnme -0.011 -0.914 -0.098 -0.032 -0.013 -0.041 0.022 
 (3.67)*** (5.08)*** (5.13)*** (2.88)*** (1.88)* (2.44)** (2.98)*** 
lnbm -0.012 -0.270 0.042 0.151 -0.014 -0.121 -0.003 
 (2.85)*** (2.41)** (1.25) (6.30)*** (1.42) (6.62)*** (0.95) 
mom 0.001 0.052 0.008 0.002 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 
 (7.28)*** (14.64)*** (10.17)*** (3.36)*** (1.80)* (11.36)*** (2.04)** 
cret -0.001 0.217 0.039 0.036 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.86)* (27.92)*** (12.64)*** (15.48)*** (3.08)*** (0.14) (2.06)** 
sue 0.001 0.532 -0.008 0.011 -0.017 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.47) (12.00)*** (0.72) (1.52) (4.26)*** (0.58) (1.12) 
dy 0.385 -6.600 -2.809 -1.005 -1.316 -0.261 -0.433 
 (0.85) (1.12) (2.07)** (0.89) (2.16)** (0.24) (1.64) 
ivol 0.013 -0.003 -0.045 -0.028 -0.003 -0.017 0.009 
 (2.60)** (0.04) (1.32) (1.54) (0.28) (0.68) (1.86)* 
ivolu -0.003 -0.684 -0.178 -0.062 -0.014 -0.059 -0.006 
 (0.58) (6.70)*** (5.19)*** (2.40)** (1.25) (2.67)*** (1.39) 
beta 0.006 -0.108 0.080 0.003 0.020 0.053 0.000 
 (1.24) (0.70) (2.01)** (0.14) (1.33) (2.86)*** (0.02) 
disp 0.001 -0.887 0.062 0.274 -0.045 -0.174 -0.001 
 (0.05) (4.07)*** (0.91) (5.69)*** (2.05)** (3.75)*** (0.08) 
illiq -0.033 0.198 -0.125 -0.043 -0.017 -0.066 0.008 
 (3.47)*** (1.67)* (3.39)*** (2.13)** (3.01)*** (2.90)*** (1.97)* 
lag trading 0.225 -0.063 -0.146 -0.026 0.020 -0.084 -0.377 
 (43.46)*** (7.14)*** (17.58)*** (2.93)*** (1.47) (6.42)*** (16.44)*** 
_cons 0.043 7.609 0.916 0.362 0.107 0.364 -0.119 
 (1.58) (5.83)*** (6.04)*** (3.60)*** (2.33)** (2.54)** (2.64)*** 
R2 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.18 





Table 1.7 Liquidity shock-driven trades and returns. 
The table presents the results of a two stage analysis. The first stage regression is a baseline stock-
level Fama-MacBeth regression of institutional trading variable on lagged liquidity shocks 
(LIQUS) and controls 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1, where t+1 is 
a month when institutional trading takes place and t is a previous month. Inst tradingi,t  is measured 
by net institutional trading from ANcerno database. Based on the 1st stage regression results I 
construct a predicted trading variable 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡. The second stage 
regression is a Fama-MacBeth regression of future returns on predicted trading and controls 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡+1. Stock characteristics: 
BETA is market Beta, LNME is natural logarithm of firm’s market value, LNBM is natural 
logarithm of stock’s book-to-market ratio, RET is the stock return in the month preceding trading 
quarter, MOM is 11-month momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, IVOLU are shocks in 
IVOL, DISP is analyst forecast dispersion, SUE is standardized unexpected earnings, DY is 
quarterly dividend yield, LAG is the previous month value of the trading variable. T statistics are 
based on Newey-West standard errors (4 lags). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
1st stage ANcerno trading  2nd stage ret (t+1) 
liqus 0.019  Predicted Trading 5.276 
 (8.93)***   (2.74)*** 
lnme -0.012  lnme -0.138 
 (3.99)***   (2.64)*** 
lnbm -0.011  lnbm 0.003 
 (2.73)***   (0.03) 
mom 0.001  mom -0.001 
 (6.88)***   (0.27) 
ret -0.001  ret -0.005 
 (1.80)*   (0.72) 
sue 0.002  sue 0.102 
 (0.56)   (2.83)*** 
dy 0.365  dy -2.802 
 (0.82)   (0.61) 
ivol 0.013  ivol -0.225 
 (2.66)***   (1.23) 
ivolu -0.004  ivolu 0.050 
 (0.65)   (0.32) 
beta 0.008  beta -0.019 
 (1.63)   (0.11) 
disp 0.005  disp -0.363 
 (0.36)   (1.71)* 
illiq -0.025  illiq -0.080 
 (2.71)***   (0.46) 
lag trading 0.224  lag -0.089 
 (45.12)***   (4.10)*** 
_cons 0.044  _cons 1.821 
 (1.68)*   (2.71)*** 
R2 0.06  R2 0.09 




Table 1.8 Cross-sectional regressions with interaction terms 
The table presents the results of a stock-level  Fama-MacBeth type regression of institutional 
trading variable on lagged liquidity shocks (LIQUS), controls and interaction between a given 
control variable and liquidity shock:  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡+1(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜅𝑡+1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1, where t+1 is a month when institutional trading 
takes place and t is a previous month. Inst tradingi,t  is measured by net institutional trading from 
ANcerno database. Stock characteristics included in the interactions are: LNME is natural 
logarithm of firm’s market value, RET is the stock return in the previous month, LNBM is natural 
logarithm of stock’s book-to-market ratio, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, SUE is standardized 
unexpected earnings. The liquidity and control variables used in interactions have been centered 
with the exception of SUE for which value zero has meaningful interpretation. T statistics are 






 1 2 3 4 5 6 
liqus 0.017 0.015 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.019 
 (6.97)** (6.10)** (9.16)** (7.48)** (8.67)** (8.33)** 
lnme*liqus -0.008      
 (4.18)**      
ret*liqus  -0.001     
  (4.66)**     
lnbm*liqus   -0.000    
   (0.02)    
ivol*liqus    0.014   
    (5.58)**   
illiq*liqus     -0.030  
     (4.09)**  
sue*liqus      -0.002 
      (0.72) 
lnme -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
 (4.20)** (4.06)** (4.03)** (3.87)** (4.09)** (4.00)** 
lnbm -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 (2.84)** (2.63)** (1.90) (2.81)** (2.62)** (2.72)** 
mom 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (7.29)** (6.85)** (7.00)** (6.72)** (6.79)** (6.89)** 
cret -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.82) (1.29) (1.80) (1.97) (1.80) (1.80) 
sue 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.55) (0.61) (0.57) (0.58) (0.55) (0.43) 
dy 0.319 0.394 0.349 0.400 0.379 0.380 
 (0.72) (0.88) (0.79) (0.90) (0.85) (0.85) 
ivol 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.014 
 (2.65)** (2.89)** (2.58)* (2.10)* (2.85)** (2.75)** 
ivolu -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.62) (0.71) (0.63) (0.61) (0.77) (0.70) 
beta 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (1.68) (1.67) (1.67) (1.61) (1.53) (1.58) 
disp 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.005 
 (0.45) (0.35) (0.38) (0.49) (0.29) (0.32) 
illiq -0.013 -0.028 -0.025 -0.021 -0.048 -0.025 
 (1.39) (2.99)** (2.60)* (2.24)* (3.95)** (2.80)** 
lag trading 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 
 (45.08)** (45.08)** (45.04)** (45.06)** (45.12)** (45.16)** 
_cons -0.033 0.045 0.055 0.072 0.043 0.046 
 (2.88)** (1.70) (2.03)* (3.11)** (1.69) (1.74) 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 




Table 1.9 Cross-sectional regression with positive and negative individual liquidity shocks 
The table presents the results of a stock-level Fama-MacBeth type regression of institutional 
trading variable on lagged positive and negative liquidity shocks (LIQUS) and controls: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡+1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡+1𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜋𝑡+1𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1, where t+1 is a month when institutional trading takes place 
and t is a previous month. Inst tradingi,t  is measured by net institutional trading from ANcerno 
database.  Stock characteristics: BETA is market Beta, LNME is natural logarithm of firm’s market 
value, LNBM is natural logarithm of stock’s book-to-market ratio, MOM is 11-month momentum, 
RET Pos and RET Neg are the positive and negative stock return in the previous month, IVOL is 
idiosyncratic volatility, IVOLU are shocks in IVOL, DISP is analyst forecast dispersion, SUE is 
standardized unexpected earnings, DY is quarterly dividend yield, LAG is the previous month 
value of the trading variable. T statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors, 4 lags. * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 ANcerno 
liqus positive 0.014 
 (2.06)** 




































Table 1.10 Cross-sectional regressions for institutional trading in subperiods 
The table presents the results of a stock-level Fama-MacBeth type regression of institutional trading variable on lagged liquidity shocks 
(LIQUS) and controls 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑡+1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1, where t+1 is a month when institutional trading 
takes place and t is a previous month. Inst tradingi,t  is measured by net institutional trading from ANcerno database. Stock characteristics: 
BETA is market Beta, LNME is natural logarithm of firm’s market value, LNBM is natural logarithm of stock’s book-to-market ratio, 
RET is the stock return in the month preceding trading quarter, MOM is 11-month momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, IVOLU 
are shocks in IVOL, DISP is analyst forecast dispersion, SUE is standardized unexpected earnings, DY is quarterly dividend yield, lag 
trading is the previous month value of the trading variable. T statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors, 2 lags. The analysis is 
performed for the periods of positive and negative values of the average market liquidity shocks (column 1), the times of contraction 
and expansion, as defined by NBER (column 2), the times of high and low VIX - below and above the monthly VIX median in the 








*T-test for a difference in coefficients on liqus between two subperiods 
 












liqus 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.018  
 (5.69)*** (6.39)*** (4.68)*** (6.97)*** (6.77)*** (5.19)*** (5.85)*** (5.97)***  
lnme -0.017 -0.005 -0.004 -0.014 -0.001 -0.023 -0.009 -0.015  
 (4.44)*** (1.51) (0.81) (4.64)*** (0.17) (10.28)*** (2.12)** (4.58)***  
lnbm -0.019 -0.002 -0.002 -0.014 -0.001 -0.022 -0.011 -0.012  
 (3.55)*** (0.42) (0.20) (3.48)*** (0.11) (4.48)*** (1.80)* (2.29)**  
mom 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
 (7.76)*** (3.83)*** (1.35) (9.00)*** (4.00)*** (7.26)*** (6.89)*** (4.13)***  
ret -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  
 (2.32)** (0.78) (0.64) (2.67)*** (0.15) (3.13)*** (1.97)* (1.03)  
sue -0.004 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.008  
 (1.13) (1.85)* (0.91) (0.20) (0.48) (0.40) (1.24) (2.34)**  
dy 0.145 0.637 1.144 0.165 -0.060 0.779 -0.167 0.897  
 (0.23) (1.01) (1.58) (0.30) (0.09) (1.21) (0.24) (1.49)  
ivol 0.018 0.008 0.020 0.012 0.018 0.009 0.016 0.011  
 (2.80)*** (1.04) (1.69) (2.11)** (2.71)*** (1.13) (1.96)* (1.78)*  
ivolu -0.008 0.001 0.020 -0.010 -0.000 -0.007 -0.022 0.014  
 (1.23) (0.12) (1.34) (1.69)* (0.05) (0.97) (2.92)*** (1.94)*  
beta 0.015 -0.001 0.012 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.007  
 (2.55)** (0.16) (0.96) (1.36) (1.07) (1.29) (1.29) (1.04)  
disp 0.021 -0.014 0.014 0.003 -0.007 0.017 0.011 0.000  
 (1.29) (0.49) (0.49) (0.17) (0.30) (0.73) (0.42) (0.00)  
illiq -0.044 -0.001 -0.007 -0.029 0.001 -0.051 -0.023 -0.027  
 (3.93)*** (0.09) (0.34) (3.03)*** (0.12) (3.87)*** (2.48)** (1.59)  
lag trading 0.223 0.225 0.200 0.230 0.213 0.234 0.227 0.221  
 (34.77)*** (32.79)*** (29.47)*** (44.02)*** (32.41)*** (39.21)*** (34.46)*** (32.36)***  
_cons 0.070 0.013 -0.025 0.062 -0.047 0.133 0.027 0.062  
 (2.01)** (0.40) (0.57) (2.33)** (1.45) (5.80)*** (0.75) (1.95)*  
R2 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06  
N 211,151 164,111  70,839 304,423 174,123 201,139 190,962 184,300  
Diff*   0.000  -0.005  0.001  0.002 




Table 1.11 Cross-sectional regressions for different ANcerno client types 
The table presents the results of a stock-level Fama-MacBeth type regression of institutional 
trading variable on lagged liquidity shocks (LIQUS) and controls 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑡+1 +
𝛽𝑡+1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡+1, where t+1 is a month when institutional trading takes place and 
t is a previous month. Inst tradingi,t  is measured by net institutional trading from ANcerno database 
by institutions assigned to different ANcerno database clients – pension plan sponsors, managers 
and brokers. Stock characteristics: BETA is market Beta, LNME is natural logarithm of firm’s 
market value, LNBM is natural logarithm of stock’s book-to-market ratio, MOM is 11-month 
momentum, RET is the stock return in the previous month (in the last month of preceding quarter),  
IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, IVOLU are shocks to IVOL, DISP is analyst forecast dispersion, 
SUE is standardized unexpected earnings, DY is quarterly dividend yield, lag trading is the 
previous month (quarter) value of the trading variable. T statistics are based on Newey-West 
standard errors, 4 lags. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 pension plan 
sponsor 
manager broker missing difference PPS 
and manager 
liqus 0.003 0.010 -0.000 0.006 0.007 
 (6.46)*** (6.25)*** (0.78) (4.65)*** (47.9***) 
lnme -0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.001  
 (2.34)** (3.93)*** (0.95) (1.45)  
lnbm -0.002 -0.010 -0.000 0.001  
 (2.67)*** (2.66)*** (1.11) (0.39)  
mom 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000  
 (6.69)*** (5.95)*** (1.47) (1.98)**  
ret 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001  
 (7.09)*** (4.88)*** (1.01) (3.53)***  
sue 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002  
 (3.18)*** (0.56) (1.02) (2.07)**  
dy 0.096 0.287 0.025 -0.010  
 (1.19) (0.69) (2.16)** (0.07)  
ivol 0.004 0.008 -0.000 -0.001  
 (3.93)*** (2.01)** (0.98) (0.39)  
ivolu -0.005 0.003 0.000 -0.002  
 (3.91)*** (0.46) (0.62) (0.64)  
beta 0.001 0.008 -0.000 0.000  
 (1.48) (1.71)* (0.54) (0.05)  
disp -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.006  
 (0.44) (0.21) (0.73) (1.05)  
illiq -0.001 -0.028 -0.000 0.002  
 (0.23) (3.73)*** (0.82) (0.98)  
lag trading 0.007 0.178 0.000 0.032  
 (12.10)*** (32.92)*** (2.19)** (6.56)***  
_cons -0.002 0.050 -0.001 0.008  
 (0.33) (2.50)** (1.16) (0.75)  
R2 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02  








Table 1.12 Panel vector autoregression analysis  
The table reports estimates from panel vector autoregression with firm fixed effects following equation 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆
𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1  , 
where vector yit = (Institutional Tradingit, Returnit, LIQUSit)’ , αi is a 3x1 vector of firm-specific intercepts, λi, l = 1, …, L, are 3x3 
coefficient matrices, and εit is a 3x1 vector of innovations. The model is estimated using system GMM with three lags. The number of 
observations is 448,511. T-statistics are reported next to coefficient estimates. In Panel A Return is measured by Excess Return – stock 
return less the risk-free rate. In Panel B, I measure the four-factor alpha (based on Fama-French (1993) three factor model with Carhart 
(1997) momentum factor).  * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
 
Panel A 
  Liqus Trading Exret 
  (coef) (t)   (coef) (t)   (coef) (t)   
Liqus t-1 40.454 129.639 *** 1.991 2.244 ** 73.058 29.759 *** 
Liqus t-2 7.342 31.316 *** 4.724 4.018 *** -26.993 -10.489 *** 
Liqus t-3 9.223 46.924 *** 1.682 1.517   8.740 3.779 *** 
Trading t-1 0.072 2.964 *** 10.942 5.753 *** -1.090 -3.696 *** 
Trading t-2 0.092 5.017 *** 2.809 1.876 * -0.577 -2.173 ** 
Trading t-3 0.046 1.759 * 3.050 1.207   -1.349 -3.500 *** 
Exret t-1 2.136 131.493 *** 0.398 5.291 *** 0.307 1.242   
Exret t-2 0.778 54.902 *** 0.087 1.243   -4.219 -17.340 *** 











  Liqus Trading 4f alpha 
  (coef) (t)   (coef) (t)   (coef) (t)   
Liqus t-1 4.743 146.211 *** 2.940 3.297 *** 0.337 5.322 *** 
Liqus t-2 8.180 33.732 *** 4.556 3.760 *** -0.322 -4.244 *** 
Liqus t-3 7.489 37.451 *** 1.250 1.079   -0.312 -5.126 *** 
Trading t-1 0.174 7.032 *** 11.869 6.219 *** -0.003 -0.436   
Trading t-2 0.094 5.110 *** 2.675 1.760 * -0.003 -0.554   
Trading t-3 0.026 0.979   4.262 1.733 * -0.001 -0.107   
4f alpha t-1 28.253 49.910 *** 9.713 4.368 *** 94.625 360.846 *** 
4f alpha t-2 -13.463 -18.447 *** -5.546 -2.032 * 1.079 3.283 *** 




Figure 1.1 Time-series trend in average stock illiquidity and liquidity shocks 
The figure presents yearly averages of stock-level illiq (Amihud illiquidity level) and liqus 

















































































































































Figure 1.2 Time-series trend in institutional ownership ratio 
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Appendix 1.1 Bushee investor groups characteristics 
Table A1.1 presents some characteristics of Bushee (2001) investors groups. Transient 
institutions are characterized by the highest turnover among classified institutions both by using 
Carhart turnover measure and the measure incorporating net flows. Dedicated investors have on 
average largest individual assets under management, however quasi-indexers is a dominating 
group in terms of assets managed by the whole group which is related to the popularity of index 
funds (Ke and Ramalingegowda, 2005).13 Quasi-indexers are also characterized by the highest 
ownership ratio of 27%. Transient institutions as a group manage on average 13.2% of assets 
managed by institutions and their mean ownership ratio is 10%. The institutions unclassified by 
Brian Bushee are characterized by small holdings and low assets under management and their 
behavior likely has small impact on the market. 
 
  
                                                 
13 The managed assets are based on the equity holdings as listed in the 13(f) statements prepared by institutions. Thus, 
this number does not include international equity holdings, bond holdings, and other derivatives. Short positions are 




Table A1. 1 Characteristics of different Bushee (2001) investor types. 
Table presents average quarterly measures for investor types following Bushee (2001) investor 
classification in the sample period 1981-2012. The managed assets are based on the equity 
holdings as listed in the 13f statements prepared by institutions. Thus, this number does not include 
international equity holdings, bond holdings, and other derivatives. Short positions are not 
included either.Turn_1 is Carhart (1997) turnover measure – the minimum of buys and sells 
divided by average quarterly assets. Turn_2 is the minimum of buys and sells added to the absolute 
value of net flows, divided by lagged assets. Turn_3 is the sum of buys and sells less the absolute 
value of net flows, divided by lagged assets. Buys and sells are measured with end-of-quarter q − 
1 prices, where “buy” (“sell”) is an increase (decrease) in the adjusted number of shares of a given 
stock held by the institution in a given quarter q. Net flows are the difference between portfolio 
assets at the end of quarter t and assets at the end of quarter t-1 increased by the portfolio return. 




Investors class QUASI-IDEXERS DEDICATED TRANSIENT NOT CLASSIFIED 
Average Turn_1 0.069 0.072 0.210 0.149 
Average Turn_2 0.205 0.145 0.671 1.973 
Average Turn_3 0.142 0.151 0.441 0.319 
Average portfolio assets per 
manager $m 27,935 67,140 12,252 3,311 
Average managed assets per 
investor group $m 6,768,605,003 1,020,554,815 1,187,122,729 16,342,877 
Avg assets per group as % of all 
avg assets 75.3% 11.3% 13.2% 0.2% 
Number of institutions classified 2,624 262 1,608 4,477 
Mean ownership ratio 26.897 6.363 10.084 0.321 








Appendix 1.2 Variable definitions 
Below I provide detailed definitions of control variables. 
Size (LNME) – natural logarithm of the stock’s market value (price per share multiplied by shares 
outstanding) each quarter. 
Book-to-market ratio (LNBM) – natural logarithm of the ratio of book to market value, where 
book value is the book value of stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
(if available), minus the book value of preferred stock for the last fiscal year end in t -1; the market 
value is calculated at the end of December of t -1.14  
Return (RET) – stock return over a month preceding the institutional trading quarter, the variable 
is winsorized quarterly at 1 and 99%. 
Momentum (MOM) - the cumulative return of a stock over 11 months ending one month prior to 
the portfolio formation month (the month preceding the quarter of institutional trading), as in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the variable is winsorized quarterly at 1 and 99%. 
Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) - stock’s quarterly unexpected earnings (UE) scaled by 
its standard deviation over the preceding eight quarters (minimum four). Following Ball and 
Brown (1968) and Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), unexpected earnings are defined as the 
difference between stock’s basic EPS excluding extraordinary items in quarters q and q-4: 
𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑞 = 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞 − 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−4 (A1.1) 
Dividend yield (DY) is measured as cash dividends in a given quarter divided by the price at the 
end of the quarter. 
Stock idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is measured monthly as the standard deviation of the 
residuals from the following regression of daily excess stock returns on market excess returns and 
size and book-to-market factors of Fama and French (1993). Risk free rate used to compute excess 
returns is the rate of one-month treasury bills and market return is the CRSP value-weighted index; 
the rates and factors are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website.15 
𝑅𝑖,𝑑 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑑 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑑) + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑑 + 𝜑𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑑 + 𝑖,𝑑 (A1.2) 
                                                 





The variable is winsorized quarterly at 1 and 99%. 
Unexpected shocks to idiosyncratic volatility (IVOLU) are measured monthly as: 
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = (𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑉𝐺𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖|𝑡−12,𝑡−1), (A1.3) 
where AVGIVOLi|t-12,t-1 is the past 12-months mean of idiosyncratic volatility. The variable is 
winsorized quarterly at 1 and 99%. 
Market beta of the stock (BETA) is estimated based on time-series regression of monthly excess 
stock returns on current and lagged market excess returns over 60 months (minimum 24). The beta 
is calculated as a sum of coefficients of current and lagged excess stock returns. Risk free rate used 
to compute excess returns is the rate of one-month treasury bills and market return is the CRSP 
value-weighted index. 
Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (DISP) is computed as the standard deviation of annual EPS 
forecasts divided by the absolute value of the average outstanding forecast (Diether, Malloy, 






Chapter 2 How do liquidity demanding and supplying institutions 
trade on attention? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
It has been shown in a number of studies that investors have limited attention which impacts their 
trading decisions. Although many authors argued that attention deficit problems are more 
pronounced in individuals (Barber and Odean (2008)), there is a growing evidence that 
professional traders also face this constraint (Fang, Peress and Zehng (2014)).  Institutions have 
traditionally been perceived as more sophisticated and skilled investors, with greater access to 
information and resources. However, many studies have shown that institutions trade in stocks 
with mass media coverage (Fang et al. (2014)), follow sentiment (DeVault, Sias and Starks 
(2015)), trade on the wrong side of anomalies (Edelen, Ince and Kadlec (2016)) and as a result, 
suffer from bad performance. 
The aim of this paper is to examine how institutional investors trade in attention-grabbing 
stocks, where attention is measured directly by the Google search data. Da, Engelberg and Gao 
(2011) show that such measure does not impact stock prices in the long run and thus does not hold 
much informational value. If institutions display behavior consistent with limited attention theory, 
they may react to spikes in retail trader’s attention. On the other hand, if they behave as rational, 
well-informed agents without attention constraints, they will not react to attention fluctuations. 
How institutions trade on attention is an important question given the tremendous role and 




(2007), Irvine, Lipson and Puckett (2007) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009)). If investors make 
uninformed, poor trading decisions, they may not only harm their own performance, but also 
exacerbate mispricing in the market related to noisy attention spikes. Moreover, they may drain 
the liquidity from the market. 
Further, I aim to explore how trading of professional money managers on normal and high 
attention days is related to their market role as liquidity suppliers. If institutions trade on high-
attention days, they may simply meet the needs of the demanders and provide liquidity by taking 
the opposite position. In this case, institutional investors may use high volume associated with 
higher attention to implement their previous trading decisions (Lipson and Puckett (2010)) or 
simply benefit from transaction costs. Such behavior would be beneficial to price stability. If 
however they suffer from limited attention and follow the hype, they will demand liquidity 
themselves. Such trading behavior will most likely be related to poor future performance and may 
attenuate price efficiency in the market. 
The attention measure used in this study is based on directly observing retail investors’ 
attention spikes as measured by the Google searches regarding company tickers. I use high-
frequency institutional trading data from ANcerno to create daily trading variables. Additionally, 
I categorize daily institutional turnover as liquidity-demanding and liquidity-supplying based on 
the transaction costs of each execution (positive vs negative). 
A recent study by Ben-Rephael, Da and Israelsen (2016) relates institutional trading to the 
institutional attention measure based on Bloomberg terminal activity. This paper’s approach 
differs from theirs, as it aims to observe how institutions trade in response to retail attention, which 




and institutional attention measures, while correlated, are distinct and institutional attention often 
precedes the retail one. In effect, one should not expect much reaction of institutions to the retail 
attention.   
I use portfolio sorts and regression analysis to show that institutions significantly increase 
their buying and selling activity on high abnormal attention days as compared to low attention 
days by 9.5% of their average buying (selling) volume, showing that the limited attention theory 
applies to professional money managers. After classifying trades into liquidity demanding and 
supplying, I find that institutions increase their participation in both and that as a group they 
actually create outstanding liquidity demand. I also document a significant increase in transaction 
costs on high attention days, resulting in more costly executions for liquidity demanders and more 
attractive trades for liquidity suppliers. 
I further study the performance of stocks traded by institutions. Institutions tend to 
purchase stocks that perform poorly in the long term and even more so if they buy on high-attention 
days. The negative returns are mostly driven by demand buys, suggesting that they were related to 
uninformed decisions. Institutional sell decisions are less unfortunate, related only to short-term 
poor performance and sells made on high attention days actually are related to positive future 
returns for the sellers. Institutional investors who supply liquidity while selling are the best 
performers, not only earning positive returns but also benefiting from transaction costs. 
The results show that institutions do not trade consistently with theories based on their 
higher skill, better access to information and sophistication. They display limited attention and 
follow attention spikes of retail investors, which subsequently leads to their poor performance. 




By showing the return implications of instructional trades, this paper contributes to the 
debate whether institutions are informed investors and whether their trading improves market 
efficiency (see overview in Section 2.2.). It also provides new evidence regarding the inattention 
hypothesis and its impact on investor trading behavior and as a result, on asset prices. 
The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews existing literature on 
herding and its interpretation, section 2.3 describes the databases used and variable formation, 
section 2.4 analysis institutional trading on high attention days, section 2.5 examines performance 
on institutional traders and section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
It has been established in the psychology literature that attention is a scarce cognitive 
resource (Kahneman (1973)) and the finance literature has been increasingly addressing the issues 
of limited attention in the stock market. Merton (1987) proposed an “investor recognition” model 
where investors concentrate their trading in a small subset of stocks due to search costs and as a 
result stocks neglected by them trade at discount. Theoretical approach to investor attention and 
its impact on asset pricing has been presented by Peng (2005) who propose a model of learning 
with attention constraint suggesting better informativeness of large stocks and by Peng and Xiong 
(2006) with a model of investor attention allocation and category leaning behavior. Hou, Peng and 
Xiong (2009) empirically link investors’ attention with pricing anomalies such as momentum and 
post earnings announcement drift. Da et al. (2011) use direct attention measure based on Google 
searches and find that attention grabbing stocks outperform in the short term but experience return 




for stocks popular among individual investors. They also find that attention-driven trades 
contribute to the IPO effect. 
A number of studies focus on distraction, showing that certain events (macroeconomic 
events, large number of concurrent earnings announcements) or time periods (Fridays, 
summer/vacation times) distract investors, cause lower attention allocation and result in a delayed 
investor response to information and lower informativeness of the security prices (Hirshleifer, 
Lim, and Teoh (2009, 2011), Hong and Yu (2009) and Dellavigna and Pollet (2011), Liu and Peng 
(2016)). 
While limited attention is a market-wide phenomenon, it is likely to affect institutional 
investors to a lesser extent as compared to the individuals. The institutional investors have a 
number of resources at hand that help to alleviate attention limitation via access to more 
information and more efficient processing (Hendershott, Livdan, and Schürhoff (2015)): qualified 
research staff, real‐time news feeds, algorithmic trading, direct contacts with companies and 
analysts, etc. 
There is an extensive research showing that institutional investors are sophisticated in their 
trading decisions. They act as arbitrageurs and improve price efficiency (Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy (2007), Irvine, Lipson and Puckett (2007) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009)), they behave 
as informed traders (Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995) and Sias and Starks (1997)) and thus their 
trading can predict news and earnings surprises (Hendershott, Livdan and Schürhoff (2015)) as 
well as analyst report recommendations (Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007)). Lipson and Puckett 




and net buyers on extreme negative return days which they link to their superior implementation 
strategies. 
However, a number of studies questions the information content and skill level of 
institutional trades. Institutions have been shown to engage in the positive feedback trading (Cai, 
Kaul, and Zheng (2000) and Sias, Starks, and Titman (2002)) and herding (Sias (2004); also see 
Chapter 3 for literature review on herding). Edelen, Ince and Kadlec (2016) provide evidence that 
institutional investors trade on the wrong side of a number of anomalies. Regarding superior 
information possession and gathering, Griffin, Shu, and Topaloglu (2012) and Jegadeesh and Tang 
(2010) show that institutions do not trade correctly in anticipation of future earnings 
announcements and takeovers. Institutional investors also do not differentiate good and bad 
recommendations from sell-side analysts (Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012)). DeVault, Sias and 
Starks (2015) provide evidence that institutional investors trade on sentiment and their demand 
shocks enhance mispricing, in contrast to popular view that retail investors are the sentiment 
traders. 
This mixed evidence on institutional investors’ skills makes the relationship between 
attention and institutional trading an open question. Existing studies use a number of proxies for 
attention, including trading volume, extreme returns and occurrence, number and tone of the news 
announcements.  
Barber and Odean (2008) compare the behavior of different types of investors and proxy 
attention with trading volume, prior day returns and news occurrence. They find that individual 
investors are net buyers of attention grabbing stocks which leads to the temporary positive price 




(2014) analyze how institutional investors trade on the tone of public news and find them reacting 
on the day of the release but not before or after, leading to 4 week abnormal returns. Their finding 
is the strongest when it relates to news on fundamentals with less ambiguity and points to speedy 
trading as opposed to information prediction.  
Fang, Peress, and Zheng (2014) observe that mutual funds tend to buy stock with high 
media coverage. They find that funds with a lower propensity to trade high media-coverage stocks 
perform significantly better, pointing to their informational advantage.  
Ben-Rephael et al. (2016) propose a direct institutional attention measure based on news 
searching and reading in Bloomberg terminals and find that institutional response to news is 
quicker and larger than retails’. The authors provide evidence that when institutional investors 
trade on the institutional attention, they reduce price drift related to earning announcement and 
analyst recommendations modifications. They conclude that institutions facilitate information 
incorporation into stock prices. 
 
2.3 Database and variable construction 
I obtain the high frequency institutional trading data from ANcerno Ltd in the period from 
January 1999 to September 2011. ANcerno is a consulting company that analysis trading costs. 
The database covers around 10% of all institutional investors and trading patterns of those 
institutions are representative of all US institutions (Puckett and Yan (2011) and Anand, Irvine, 
Puckett and Venkataraman (2012)). Please see section 1.3 in Chapter 1 for the description of 
ANcerno database. The database gives access to trade-by-trade information on trades of 




every ticket as well as benchmark prices used for transaction cost calculation (described below). 
By using ANcerno as a source of institutional investor trading data, this study concentrates on 
potentially more sophisticated institutions who decided to subscribe to ANcerno services (Anand 
et al., 2012). 
I aggregate trade by trade data into daily trading volume measures by all institutions in a 
given stock i on a day t, scaled by shares outstanding on day t adjusted for stock splits and other 
distributions.  
In addition to identifying aggregate buy, sell, net, and overall institutional trading volume, 
I distinguish between liquidity demand and supply side of the trading. One way to determine if the 
trades were liquidity supplying or consuming is to compute execution shortfall (ES), as in Anand 
et al. (2012), Anand, Irvine, Puckett and Venkataraman (2013) and Hu (2009). Execution shortfall 
is a measure of transaction cost and shows how well the trader did relative to the benchmark price. 
The comparison is based on a weighted average execution price of a ticket. 
 
𝐸𝑆 =
(𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑏𝑢𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 
(2.1) 
I use three benchmark prices that attempt to measure fair market price of the stock at the 
time when the ticket was executed. The first and main benchmark used in this analysis is the stock 
price that prevailed in the market when ticket was sent to a broker (Perold (1988)), Jones and 
Lipson (2011), Anand et al. (2012)) and it reflects bid-ask spread, the market impact, and the drift 
in price while executing the order (Anand et al. (2012)). The other two benchmarks are used for 




(2013)). It is a pre-trade benchmark and reflects additionally the change in price from the opening 
(when supposedly the investor made the decision) to the order placement. The third benchmark is 
the weighted-average price on a given day (Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988), Puckett and Yan 
(2011) and Hu (2009)). It is a pre- and post-trade benchmark and as such, the benchmark price 
includes the price impact of given investor’s trade. Weighted average price is naive trader’s price 
(Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988)) and as benchmark is akin to comparison of performance to 
the passive index.  
Based on the Execution Shortfall measures computed with three above benchmarks, I 
define liquidity demanding trades as those with ES>0 and liquidity providing trades with ES<=0. 
For the purpose of robustness checks I also use alternative specification of liquidity 
suppliers and demanders following (Boehmer and Kelley (2009)), where investors trading 
passively – against the direction of the return are classified ad liquidity suppliers and those that 
trade in the direction of the returns are liquidity demanders16. Similar idea of liquidity supplying 
and demanding trading styles was used in Anand et al. (2013).  
Table 2.1 Panel A presents the summary statistics of institutional investor daily trading for 
different subgroups. On average, the turnover of buys and sells is similar in magnitude, amounting 
to 50% of shares outstanding. For all liquidity supply/demand classifications, there is on average 
more transactions classified as demand sells than demand buys. For liquidity suppling trades, there 
is on average larger magnitude of buys than sells. So on average, institutions supply liquidity more 
by buying and demand it more by selling. The average variable summarizing the difference 
                                                 
16 Liquidity suppliers buy when the return is negative and sell when t is positive. Liquidity demanders buy when the 




between demand and supply volume is positive, suggesting that institutions on average consume 
more liquidity than they provide.  
The summary statistics suggest that all specifications of liquidity suppliers and demanders 
are consistent with each other. Additionally, I verify the correlations between buy (sell) variables 
for different liquidity demand/supply classifications in Panel B of table 2.1. The variables created 
using opening price and market price when order was sent to the broker are highly correlated, 
between 80 to 85%. The trading classified as with/against return is also highly correlated with 
those two above measures (65-79%). Only the liquidity supply/demand breakdown based on 
weighted average daily price holds lower correlation with the others, oscillating around 60%. It is 
not surprising given that VWAP price classification considers post-trade market price in the 
transaction cost benchmark. Also there is a relatively low correlation between demand and supply 
measures for classification based on price at the time of order and VWAP, 13% and 23% 
respectively). Demand buys and supply buys for opening price and return-based classification are 
negatively correlated (for return classification by construction). Similar dynamics are observed for 
sells. Following Anand et al. (2012), I concentrate on the liquidity demand/supply classification 
based on benchmark of market price when order was sent to the broker. The results for other 
benchmarks are similar and available upon request. 
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of the transaction costs measured by the execution 
shortfall. Transactions costs are on average higher for liquidity demanders who buy (as opposed 




In order to concentrate on abnormal trading volume, for the purpose of portfolio sorts and 
regressions, all measures of institutional trading are demeaned by subtracting the daily average 
over the whole sample period, similar to Kaniel, Liu, Saar and Titman (2012).  












 I obtain the stock abnormal attention measure based on Google Trends from Hongqi Liu 
and Lin Peng for 2005-2014. The measure is based on the daily Search Volume Index (SVI) for 
firm’s ticker symbol, which specifies search intensity on a given day in comparison to the highest 
frequency over a given period. As proposed by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011), the use of Google 
Trends-based data is a direct individual investor attention proxy, as it approximates the interest of 
the retail investors in a given stock represented by its ticker. Other recent uses of Google-based 
data include Mondria, Wu, and Zhang (2010) and Drake, Roulstone and Thornock (2012). 
The abnormal attention measure is the difference between daily SVI for a given ticker and 









Table 2.3 contains Pearson correlation coefficients between institutional trading variables 
and abnormal attention. Both overall buys and sells are positively significantly correlated with 
abnormal attention measure, not only on the same day, but also a day before and after. Demand 




together, correlations from table 2.3 point that institutional investors increase their trading activity, 
both as liquidity suppliers and demanders, on days with high abnormal attention.  
The Pearson correlations between abnormal attention and execution shortfall are presented 
in Table 2.4 and show that the cost of trading for liquidity demanders is positively related to the 
attention measure. Interestingly, correlation between ES for demand sells and abnormal attention 
is twice as large as for ES for demand buys. 
I use CRSP database for daily stock-related information, I/B/E/S for earnings 
announcements and analysts’ forecasts, Compustat for company accounting data. The final sample 
spans from January 2005 to September 2011 and includes common stocks (CRSP codes 10 and 
11) listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Only stocks with price higher than $5 and lower than 
$1000 are included to mitigate market microstructure issues.  
A number of stock characteristics can potentially impact stock returns and institutions’ 
trading. In order to analyze the profitability of intuitional attention-driven trades, I introduce the 
following control variables: book-to-market ratio (lnbm), momentum (mom), short-term reversal 
(rev), idiosyncratic stock volatility (ivol), beta (beta), Amihud’s illiquidity measure (illiq), 
coefficient of variation in the Amihud illiquidity (cvilliq), size – logarithm of market value (lnme), 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), analyst earnings forecast dispersion (disp), stock’s 
monthly co-skewness (coskew), maximum daily return in each month (max), standard deviation 
of the monthly turnover over the past 12 months (sdturn),  and is dollar trading volume shock 
(voldu). The detailed descriptions of variable construction are available in Appendix 2.1. The 
summary statistics for abnormal attention measure and control variables are presented in Table 




sectional demeaning and division by the cross-sectional standard deviation and the returns are 
cross-sectionally demeaned. The regression coefficients can thus be interpreted as the impact of a 
one-standard-deviation change and the regression intercept is zero. 
 
2.4 Trading trends and transaction costs on high-attention days 
I begin this analysis of institutional trading behavior with respect to attention-grabbing 
stocks by performing univariate portfolio sorts. Each day I sort all stocks into 10 deciles based on 
their abnormal attention measure and I calculate mean and median value of various abnormal 
institutional trading measures on that day. Table 2.6 presents the results. In the first panel I 
document that institutions significantly increase their trading on high attention days. For overall 
buys, the increase in trading across attention portfolios is monotonous, with negative abnormal 
trading in deciles 1-8 and positive abnormal trading in deciles 9-10, on 20% days with highest 
attention. In case of overall sells, the difference is similar in magnitude, but almost half of it comes 
from the positive abnormal trading on the 10% highest attention days. In both cases the high-low 
difference in trading amount to approximately 9.5% of the average buying (selling) volume.  
This finding is striking as it shows that institutional investors are sensitive to the retail 
attention, which most likely is related to low-quality and noisy information. It is in contrast with 
claims that institutions are more attentive and sophisticated due to a number of resources they have 
access to. Sensitivity of institutional trading to attention provides support to the strand of literature 
that claims that institutional investors are subject to limited attention, similar to retail investors. It 




by mass media coverage (they further show that mutual funds are net buyers of stocks with mass 
media coverage).  
While Barber and Odean (2008) find that individual investors are net buyers of attention-
grabbing stocks, the symmetry of buys and sells by institutional investors that I document is to be 
expected. Barber and Odean (2008) argue that individuals cannot sell short and thus attention 
constraints mostly apply to their buying decisions, when they have to choose from the universe of 
all stocks. Institutions on the other hand, face a large number of choices both when they purchase 
and dispose of investments. 
Further, I would like to see if institutions trade on such high-attention days merely as 
liquidity providers, taking the opposite side of transaction to satisfy liquidity demand from 
individuals. It is possible that significant increase in institutional trading on high retail attention 
days is due to taking the opposite side of trade to the attention-driven individuals. In this case, I 
would see institutional investors engaging mostly in the liquidity providing trades. Institutional 
investors could be using the outstanding liquidity demand from individuals and implement their 
trading strategies, benefiting from lower transaction costs (similar to Lipson and Puckett (2010) 
who show institutions providing liquidity on extreme market movements). On the other hand, 
institutions may engage in short-term trend following, and due to their own limited attention, 
follow the retail hype and place liquidity-demanding trades (similar to DeVault et al. (2015) who 
show institutions trading on sentiment and 57% of them demanding liquidity when doing so).    
Second panel of Table 2.6 presents sorts for liquidity demanding and supplying trades. The 
difference between high and low attention portfolio is 0.0292% for liquidity demanding buys 




(0.0202, 9% of the supply buy volume). The proportion is even more striking for sells, where the 
difference between demanding sell transaction on high and low attention days 0.0339 (10.9% of 
average demand sell volume) is 1.7 times higher than for supplying sells with 0.016 difference 
(7.6% of the supply sell volume). All differences are highly significant. Moreover, only for 
demanding trades, both buys and sells, I observe monotonous increase across attention portfolios. 
For supply trades there is no clear relationship and only the high attention decile stands out with 
high abnormal volume.  
This result above shows that institutions not only trade on attention, but also demand 
liquidity when doing so. To see this more clearly, I create variables pairing demand buys and 
supply sells and vice versa on stock-day level, presented in the third panel of Table 2.6. They proxy 
for institutions trading with each other (as opposed to with individuals or other institutions not in 
this sample). The positive significant difference for “buy_dem-sell_sup” shows that on high 
attention days there is a higher outstanding liquidity demand from institutions. Similarly, negative 
differential for “buy_sup-sell_dem” shows outstanding liquidity demand from sell side when 
attention spikes. Overall, the net liquidity demand variable (sum_dem-sum_sup) shows 
outstanding demand for liquidity on 10% high attention days. 
I verify above results by applying a linear regression analysis (both using Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) method with Newey-West adjusted standard errors and panel OLS regression 
with standard errors clustered by stock and day) and including a number of control variables that 
may impact institutional trading decisions, such as size, book-to-market, liquidity and others. In 
Table 2.7 I find significant institutional buying and selling on retail investors’ attention and 




I am also interested in the change in transaction costs that comes with higher investor 
attention. In Table 2.8 I present average execution shortfall measures based on benchmark market 
price from the time when order was sent to the broker for different trade types. I find a significant 
increase in transaction costs on high attention days, resulting in more expensive transaction 
execution for liquidity demander. Conversely, liquidity suppliers get paid more on those days. The 
difference in average transaction costs between 10% high and 10% low abnormal attention days 
for liquidity demanders equals 0.000408, which accounts for 7.1% of the average demand ES. The 
difference for suppliers equals -0.000275 (negative execution costs which is actually a surplus), 
equal to 5.4% of the average supply ES. So it seems that institutional liquidity demanders 
experience higher increase in costs than liquidity suppliers in benefits on high attention days. The 
execution shortfall differential between high and low abnormal attention portfolios, of 0.000134 
equals 21% of the average ES. 
Overall, I find that intuitional investors significantly increase their trading activity in 
attention-grabbing stocks and this effect is similarly apparent for buy and sell transactions. 
Moreover, they engage both in liquidity supplying and demanding activities. I also observe a 
significant transaction cost increase on high abnormal attention days, resulting in higher benefits 
for liquidity suppliers and higher costs for the demanders. 
 
2.5 Trading patterns on high attention days and future returns 
 To be able to conclude what are the implications of institutions trading on attention, I need 
to examine the post-attention spike return performance of the stocks traded on high attention days. 




(1997) characteristics (book-to-market and size) adjusted return in different horizons (beginning 
at t+1): one week, two week, one month, a quarter return and a 6 month return. Table 2.9 presents 
coefficients from 30 regressions of various return horizons on institutional trading variable, 
abnormal attention and the interaction term between attention and institutional trading. All 
regressions include control variables, namely beta, size, book-to-market ratio, stock monthly 
reversal, momentum, co-skewness, idiosyncratic volatility, maximum daily return in each month, 
analyst forecast dispersion, Amihud illiquidity factor, coefficient of variation in the Amihud 
illiquidity, standard deviation of the monthly turnover over the past 12 months, standardized 
unexpected earnings and dollar trading volume shock. Panel A contains the results of the Fama-
MacBeth regressions with Newey-West adjusted standard errors and Panel B presents coefficient 
of the panel regressions with standard errors clustered by stock and day. The coefficients on the 
trading variables by themselves describe the general performance of daily institutional trades.  
 The results are striking; overall institutional buying trades are negatively related to future 
returns (beginning at one month, up to 6 months) implying that institutions tend to purchase bad-
performing stocks, with one standard deviation increase in intuitional buying result in a significant 
negative 20 business day return of 8.6 basis points (19.8 bp for 59 business days and 43 bp for 126 
business days). What’s more, the stocks that they buy on high abnormal attention days display 
even worse performance with additional negative 3.51 bp over 20 business days and 5.98 bp over 
59 days. The sell decisions also don’t seem to be very informed, with positive returns related to 
sell trades, albeit only in the short term. One standard deviation increase in institutional selling 
leads to positive 3.1 bp 5-day abnormal return (3 bp for 10 days and 4.3 bp for 20 days), but the 
relationship with one quarter and 6-month return is insignificant. So it does not seem that selling 




decide to sell on the high attention days however seem to be making much better decisions, which 
is supported by negative significant coefficients on the interaction term for 20 and 59 day returns. 
The negative impact of the uninformed buys outweighs the positive repercussions of sales, 
resulting in a negative relationship between net institutional daily trading and future returns, for 
all return horizons. There is no significant coefficient for the interaction term, suggesting that buys 
and sells on high attention days even each other out leaving no particular relationship with the 
future. The results by using a panel regression analysis confirm the above conclusions based on 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. 
 Next, I notice that the negative impact of buy trades comes mostly from the demand buys, 
which perform even worse on high attention days. It seems that institutions who decide to trade 
aggressively on high attention days, do not follow any sophisticated analysis, but join the crowd 
and end up with a negative performance. While supply buys also result in negative performance, 
they do so to a lesser extent and liquidity suppliers are compensated by transaction costs, which 
may outweigh the negative returns. Supply buys also seem to perform slightly worse on high 
attention days, but not in the panel regression results. 
 Similar picture arises from the analysis of sells; liquidity demanding sells are more strongly 
related to positive returns in the short term, while liquidity supplying sells actually display a 
significant negative relation with 6 month return. Also the supply sellers who trade on high 
attention days dispose of even worse performing stocks as shown by the negative significant 
coefficients on the interaction term for 20 and 59 day abnormal return regressions. 
 Overall, I find that institutional investors do not display behavior consistent with theory of 




when it comes to buy decisions. Following Barber and Odean’s (2008) reasoning, buy decision 
may be more affected by limited attention, as the investor has a huge pool of stocks to choose 
from, while when selling, investor sells only those that he owns, unless he can short sell. Many of 
institutions in ANcerno are mutual funds, which may have short selling constraints to some extent. 
The buy decisions made on high attention days result in even lower long term returns and are 
driven mostly by liquidity demanding institutions. On the other hand, sell decisions seem to bring 
negative returns only in the short term, while in the long term they are neutral and can even become 
profitable for liquidity suppliers. In addition to that, liquidity suppliers are compensated by 
transaction costs. To sum up, liquidity demanding buyers make poor investment decisions and 
liquidity supplying sellers make profitable trades. This speaks to the heterogeneity in institutional 
investors’ skill and attention. 
  
2.6 Conclusions 
The limited attention of the financial market participants is no longer doubted, however 
there is an ongoing debate to what extent professional money managers are subject to it and how 
this may impact market efficiency. By using high-frequency institutional trading data and a direct 
measure of individual investor attention based on Google search data, I find that institutions 
significantly increase their buying and selling activity on high abnormal attention days consistent 
with limited attention theory. Moreover, institutions increase both their liquidity supplying and 
demanding trading and overall create outstanding liquidity demand on high attention days. There 
is also an increase in transaction costs on high attention days. Institutions’ trading decisions result 




Professional money managers who supply liquidity enjoy positive long-term performance, 
particularly those trading on high attention days and they benefit from higher transaction costs. 
The results suggest that institutions as a group are not particularly sophisticated, suffer from 
limited attention and make bad investment decisions. They trade following hype, exacerbating the 
mispricing in the market. However, they also serve a positive and stabilizing role as liquidity 
suppliers. 
There are many subjects worth further study. It would be interesting to see how different 
types of institutions fit the picture. Moreover, it may be worth categorizing institutions as average 
liquidity providers and demanders, in the spirit of Anand et al. (2013) and follow their trading and 
performance. It is wort a closer analysis whether liquidity suppliers perform well due to good 
timing and implementation decisions and whether liquidity demanders perform poorly because 






Table 2.1 Summary statistics of institutional trading variables 
Panel A. Summary statistics of institutional investor daily trading before computing abnormal trading by demeaning following equation 
2.2. Buy_all, sell_all and net_all are aggregate daily buy (or sell or net= buy minus sell) transactions of institutional investors for a given 
stock divided by shares outstanding. Buy_dem, sell_dem, net_dem and sum_dem are daily institutional trading variables for liquidity 
demanding trades and buy_sup, sell_sup, net_sup and sum_sup for liquidity providing trades. buy_dem-sell_sup, buy_sup-sell_dem and 
sum_dem-sum_sup variables have been calculated and aggregated on day-stock level. 
statistics N mean sd min median max skewness kurtosis 
all         
buy_all 1,297,879 0.551 1.181 0.000 0.125 28.027 4.807 37.832 
sell_all 1,297,879 0.546 1.230 0.000 0.109 36.370 5.125 45.277 
net_all 1,297,879 0.005 1.488 -36.339 0.008 28.022 -0.330 26.342 
sum_all 1,297,879 1.098 1.897 0.000 0.423 48.319 4.394 35.327 
         
ES benchmark - price when order sent to broker      
buy_dem 1,297,879 0.305 0.774 0.000 0.029 20.599 5.015 39.823 
sell_dem 1,297,879 0.311 0.826 0.000 0.023 28.778 5.601 55.147 
net_dem 1,297,879 -0.006 1.085 -28.778 0.000 20.599 -0.564 26.838 
sum_dem 1,297,879 0.616 1.177 0.000 0.166 38.442 4.245 32.869 
buy_sup 1,297,879 0.223 0.636 0.000 0.019 23.591 6.236 69.115 
sell_sup 1,297,879 0.210 0.626 0.000 0.010 14.452 5.975 53.982 
net_sup 1,297,879 0.013 0.859 -14.452 0.000 23.591 0.238 34.082 
sum_sup 1,297,879 0.433 0.924 0.000 0.094 25.055 4.771 40.456 
buy_dem-sell_sup 1,297,879 0.094 0.893 -14.452 0.001 20.599 1.036 27.093 
buy_sup-sell_dem 1,297,879 -0.088 0.934 -28.704 0.000 23.586 -1.454 37.136 








Table 2.1 Panel A continued 
statistics N mean sd min median max skewness kurtosis 
ES benchmark-opening price        
buy_dem 1,297,879 0.277 0.772 0.000 0.010 17.177 5.258 41.779 
sell_dem 1,297,879 0.289 0.845 0.000 0.006 28.778 6.085 65.497 
net_dem 1,297,879 -0.013 1.178 -28.778 0.000 17.177 -0.768 27.330 
sum_dem 1,297,879 0.566 1.109 0.000 0.136 33.923 4.211 32.603 
buy_sup 1,297,879 0.247 0.728 0.000 0.012 24.251 6.375 69.566 
sell_sup 1,297,879 0.227 0.691 0.000 0.004 18.024 5.931 53.153 
net_sup 1,297,879 0.020 1.024 -18.024 0.000 24.251 0.467 30.804 
sum_sup 1,297,879 0.474 0.983 0.000 0.107 26.889 4.548 36.059 
buy_dem-sell_sup 1,297,879 0.050 0.883 -18.024 0.000 17.177 0.509 30.162 
buy_sup-sell_dem 1,297,879 -0.043 0.943 -28.704 0.000 24.246 -0.926 42.936 
sum_dem-sum_sup 1,297,879 0.093 1.273 -24.246 0.008 32.266 0.451 20.412 
         
ES benchmark - VWAP of the day       
buy_dem 1,297,879 0.275 0.691 0.000 0.034 20.101 5.203 45.844 
sell_dem 1,297,879 0.275 0.733 0.000 0.023 27.586 5.760 61.634 
net_dem 1,297,879 0.000 0.944 -27.586 0.000 20.101 -0.568 32.218 
sum_dem 1,297,879 0.549 1.067 0.000 0.144 30.359 4.349 34.843 
buy_sup 1,297,879 0.254 0.676 0.000 0.027 19.912 5.399 47.187 
sell_sup 1,297,879 0.249 0.680 0.000 0.018 16.508 5.321 42.579 
net_sup 1,297,879 0.006 0.898 -16.508 0.000 19.911 0.010 25.742 
sum_sup 1,297,879 0.503 1.016 0.000 0.116 26.896 4.291 31.317 
buy_dem-sell_sup 1,297,879 0.026 0.881 -16.508 0.001 20.101 0.075 25.623 
buy_sup-sell_dem 1,297,879 -0.020 0.904 -27.574 0.000 19.907 -0.629 33.205 







Table 2.1 Panel A continued 
stats N mean sd min median max skewness kurtosis 
return-based liq specification         
buy_dem         1,297,879  0.280 0.812 0.000 0.000 21.896 5.497 47.670 
sell_dem         1,297,879  0.281 0.849 0.000 0.000 28.682 5.923 58.050 
net_dem         1,297,879  -0.000 1.239 -28.682 0.000 21.896 -0.385 24.917 
sum_dem         1,297,879  0.561 1.105 0.000 0.131 28.682 4.098 29.495 
buy_sup         1,297,879  0.241 0.743 0.000 0.000 25.314 6.553 73.760 
sell_sup         1,297,879  0.233 0.740 0.000 0.000 18.024 6.325 62.369 
net_sup         1,297,879  0.008 1.101 -18.024 0.000 25.314 0.085 31.677 
sum_sup         1,297,879  0.474 0.994 0.000 0.105 25.314 4.637 37.479 
buy_dem-sell_sup         1,297,879  0.047 0.911 -18.024 0.000 21.896 0.373 36.876 
buy_sup-sell_dem         1,297,879  -0.040 0.933 -28.608 0.000 25.308 -0.642 43.797 








Panel B Correlations between buy and sell variables for different liquidity demand/supply classifications. BP is ES benchmark - price 
when order sent to broker, OP is ES benchmark-opening price, VWAP is ES benchmark - VWAP of the day and RET is return-based 
liq specification. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) buy_dem BP 1        
(2) buy_dem OP 0.8373* 1       
(3) buy_dem VWAP 0.6812* 0.6394* 1      
(4) buy_dem RET 0.7269* 0.7965* 0.5537* 1     
(5) buy_sup BP 0.1307* 0.1633* 0.4616* 0.2504* 1    
(6) buy_sup OP 0.2295* -0.0354* 0.4202* 0.1318* 0.8110* 1   
(7) buy_sup VWAP 0.5402* 0.4489* 0.2293* 0.5020* 0.6122* 0.6060* 1  
(8) buy_sup RET 0.2847* 0.1092* 0.4552* -0.1121* 0.6728* 0.7689* 0.4998* 1 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) sell_dem BP 1        
(2) sell_dem OP 0.8536* 1       
(3) sell_dem VWAP 0.6912* 0.6624* 1      
(4) sell_dem RET 0.7302* 0.7918* 0.5531* 1     
(5) sell_sup BP 0.1414* 0.1908* 0.4646* 0.2637* 1    
(6) sell_sup OP 0.2123* -0.0269* 0.4014* 0.1269* 0.7974* 1   
(7) sell_sup VWAP 0.5494* 0.4767* 0.2352* 0.5217* 0.5990* 0.5778* 1  









Table 2.2 Summary statistics of transaction costs 
Summary statistics of average transaction costs measured by the average Execution Shortfall, following equation 2.1 
statistics N mean sd min median max skewness kurtosis 
benchmark - price when order sent to broker        
avg ES stock/day/buys of demanders 1,297,879 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.183 5.824 62.076 
avg ES stock/day/buys of suppliers 1,297,654 -0.003 0.007 -0.202 0.000 0.000 -5.629 59.131 
avg ES stock/day/sells of demanders 1,297,879 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.158 6.968 87.359 
avg ES stock/day/sells of suppliers 1,297,695 -0.002 0.005 -0.143 0.000 0.000 -7.344 100.270 
avg ES stock/day volume demanders 1,297,879 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.186 4.967 45.760 
avg ES stock/day volume suppliers 1,297,446 -0.005 0.008 -0.202 -0.002 0.000 -4.793 43.085 
avg ES stock/day  1,297,446 0.001 0.011 -0.197 0.000 0.174 0.531 26.613 
benchmark-opening price         
avg ES stock/day/buys of demanders 1,297,879 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.210 5.178 49.940 
avg ES stock/day/buys of suppliers 1,297,878 -0.004 0.009 -0.204 0.000 0.000 -4.833 43.246 
avg ES stock/day/sells of demanders 1,297,879 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.165 5.608 57.055 
avg ES stock/day/sells of suppliers 1,297,879 -0.003 0.006 -0.170 0.000 0.000 -5.665 59.790 
avg ES stock/day volume demanders 1,297,879 0.008 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.210 4.352 35.936 
avg ES stock/day volume suppliers 1,297,878 -0.007 0.010 -0.204 -0.004 0.000 -4.092 31.708 
avg ES stock/day  1,297,878 0.001 0.013 -0.202 0.000 0.210 0.561 22.809 
benchmark - VWAP of the day         
avg ES stock/day/buys of demanders 1,297,879 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.113 6.831 96.811 
avg ES stock/day/buys of suppliers 1,297,879 -0.002 0.003 -0.093 -0.001 0.000 -5.925 69.154 
avg ES stock/day/sells of demanders 1,297,879 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.064 5.445 55.669 
avg ES stock/day/sells of suppliers 1,297,879 -0.001 0.003 -0.074 0.000 0.000 -6.286 77.781 
avg ES stock/day volume demanders 1,297,879 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.117 5.046 52.093 
avg ES stock/day volume suppliers 1,297,879 -0.003 0.005 -0.112 -0.002 0.000 -4.877 47.307 







Table 2.3 Pearson correlations between abnormal attention and institutional trading 
Star signifies 1% significance. Buy_all, sell_all and net_all are aggregate daily buy (or sell or net= buy minus sell) transactions of 
institutional investors for a given stock divided by shares outstanding. Buy_dem, sell_dem, net_dem and sum_dem are daily institutional 
trading variables for liquidity demanding trades and buy_sup, sell_sup, net_sup and sum_sup for liquidity providing trades. buy_dem-
sell_sup, buy_sup-sell_dem and sum_dem-sum_sup variables have been calculated and aggregated on day-stock level. Daily abnormal 
attention variable is as defined in equation 2.3, lag abn att is abnormal attention at time t-1 and lead abn att is abnormal attention at time 
t+1. 
 
Panel A All institutions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) lag abn att  1      
(2) abn att 0.5856* 1     
(3) lead abn att 0.4515* 0.6036* 1    
(4) buy_all  0.0125* 0.0157* 0.0092* 1   
(5) sell_all  0.0144* 0.0180* 0.0108* 0.2384* 1  











Panel B Liquidity demanders and suppliers, benchmark - price when order sent to broker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (12) (13) (14) 
(1)   lag abn att  1            
(2)   abn att  0.5856* 1           
(3)   lead abn att 0.4515* 0.6036* 1          
(4)   buy_dem 0.0098* 0.0124* 0.0081* 1         
(5)   sell_dem 0.0131* 0.0165* 0.0094* 0.0819* 1        
(6)   buy_sup 0.0105* 0.0128* 0.0068* 0.1307* 0.2034* 1       
(7)   sell_sup 0.0090* 0.0112* 0.0077* 0.1995* 0.1414* 0.0736* 1      
(8)   net_dem -0.0029* -0.0037* -0.0014 0.6515* -0.7027* -0.0615* 0.0348* 1     
(9)   net_sup 0.0012 0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0486* 0.0475* 0.6868* -0.6744* -0.0709* 1    
(10) buy dem-sell sup 0.0022 0.0029* 0.0016 0.7270* -0.0281* 0.0618* -0.5278* 0.5404* 0.4304* 1   
(11) buy sup-sell dem -0.0044* -0.0058* -0.0037* 0.0166* -0.7455* 0.5009* -0.0750* 0.5793* 0.4255* 0.0669* 1  








Table 2.4 Pearson correlations between abnormal attention and transaction costs 
Pearson correlations between abnormal attention and average Execution Shortfall, following equation 2.1. Star signifies 1% significance. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) lag abn att 1          
(2) abn att 0.5856* 1         
(3) lead abn att 0.4515* 0.6036* 1        
(4) avg ES stock/day/buys of demanders 0.0047* 0.0059* 0.0036* 1       
(5) avg ES stock/day/buys of suppliers -0.0043* -0.0098* -0.0083* 0.1658* 1      
(6) avg ES stock/day/sells of demanders 0.0075* 0.0114* 0.0090* -0.1387* -0.2599* 1     
(7) avg ES stock/day/sells of suppliers -0.0091* -0.0091* -0.0066* -0.2994* -0.1346* 0.0997* 1    
(8) avg ES stock/day volume demanders 0.0089* 0.0126* 0.0090* 0.7692* -0.0163* 0.5061* -0.1926* 1   
(9) avg ES stock/day volume suppliers -0.0090* -0.0141* -0.0112* -0.0240* 0.8043* -0.1715* 0.4590* -0.1248* 1  








Table 2.5 Summary statistics of control variables and abnormal attention 
Summary statistics of the daily abnormal attention variable as defined in equation 2.3 and control variables compute in monthly 
frequency. Beta is market beta, lnme is natural logarithm of firm’s market value, lnbm is natural logarithm of stock’s book-to-market 
ratio, rev is the stock return in the month preceding abnormal attention month, coskew is stock’s monthly co-skewness, ivol is 
idiosyncratic volatility, max is maximum daily return in each month, disp is analyst forecast dispersion, illiq is Amihud illiquidity factor, 
cvilliq is coefficient of variation in the Amihud illiquidity, sdturn is standard deviation of the monthly turnover over the past 12 months, 
sue is standardized unexpected earnings and voldu is dollar trading volume shock. 
 
statistics N mean sd min median max skewness kurtosis 
abnormal attention 1,249,281 0.001 1.001 -4.753 -0.068 12.776 2.267 22.339 
beta 1,118,389 0.002 0.988 -6.888 -0.152 9.896 1.211 6.143 
lnme 1,147,103 0.123 0.922 -3.176 0.052 3.314 0.402 3.047 
lnbm 1,140,601 -0.025 0.995 -9.231 0.078 4.916 -0.952 6.145 
mom 1,147,103 -0.010 0.971 -2.450 -0.143 5.284 1.340 6.653 
rev 1,147,103 -0.007 0.956 -8.330 -0.051 20.855 1.063 13.484 
coskew 1,118,389 0.006 0.969 -8.707 -0.063 14.874 1.495 15.864 
ivol 1,147,103 -0.052 0.953 -1.579 -0.281 5.227 1.593 6.370 
max 1,147,103 -0.030 0.929 -2.035 -0.244 25.872 4.334 44.079 
disp 1,147,103 0.005 0.990 -0.595 -0.267 8.548 5.187 33.515 
illiq 1,147,103 -0.145 0.481 -0.328 -0.208 9.023 12.503 187.391 
cvilliq 1,146,850 -0.101 0.748 -2.409 -0.187 17.938 2.916 32.284 
sdturn 1,146,158 0.009 0.957 -1.112 -0.229 25.825 7.408 117.136 
sue 1,078,798 -0.002 1.000 -3.252 -0.005 2.904 -0.065 2.663 








Table 2.6 Attention portfolio sorts and institutional trading 
Stocks listed on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq are sorted each day into 10 decile portfolios based on the abnormal attention measure. The 
table reports average values of institutional trading measures on that day. Buys all, sells all and net all are aggregate daily buy (or sell 
or net= buy minus sell) transactions of institutional investors for a given stock divided by shares outstanding. Buy_dem, sell_dem, 
net_dem and sum_dem are daily institutional trading variables for liquidity demanding trades and buy_sup, sell_sup, net_sup and 
sum_sup for liquidity providing trades. Buy_dem-sell_sup, buy_sup-sell_dem and sum_dem-sum_sup variables have been calculated 
and aggregated on day-stock level. All institutional trading variables have been demeaned following equation 2.2.  The last row reports 
the difference in institutional trading between high (highest attention days) and low (lowest attention days). T statistics are reported in 
parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
  buys all   sells all   net all   sum all 
port mean median   mean median   mean median   mean median 
            
1 -0.0249 -0.0539  -0.0279 -0.0613  0.0031 0.0062  -0.0528 -0.0999 
2 -0.0139 -0.0515  -0.0162 -0.0612  0.0023 0.0005  -0.0301 -0.0994 
3 -0.0116 -0.0373  -0.0186 -0.0536  0.0070 0.0026  -0.0303 -0.0943 
4 -0.0057 -0.0315  -0.0072 -0.0454  0.0015 0.0068  -0.0129 -0.0641 
5 -0.0017 -0.0433  -0.0051 -0.0459  0.0034 0.0052  -0.0068 -0.0785 
6 -0.0044 -0.0372  -0.0099 -0.0482  0.0055 -0.0003  -0.0143 -0.0680 
7 -0.0022 -0.0406  -0.0055 -0.0494  0.0033 0.0064  -0.0077 -0.0657 
8 -0.0017 -0.0370  -0.0023 -0.0366  0.0005 0.0009  -0.0040 -0.0678 
9 0.0108 -0.0168  0.0029 -0.0418  0.0079 0.0083  0.0137 -0.0508 
10 0.0272 -0.0068  0.0273 -0.0145  -0.0001 0.0063  0.0545 -0.0042 
            
H-L  0.0521***  0.0552***  -0.0031   0.107***  







  buy_dem   buy_sup   sell_dem   sell_sup 
port mean median  mean median  mean median  mean median 
            
1 -0.0171 -0.0355  -0.0066 -0.0315  -0.0177 -0.0445  -0.0076 -0.0329 
2 -0.0094 -0.0353  -0.0038 -0.0296  -0.0112 -0.0410  -0.0028 -0.0280 
3 -0.0083 -0.0314  -0.0023 -0.0281  -0.0100 -0.0353  -0.0072 -0.0267 
4 -0.0036 -0.0238  -0.0014 -0.0283  -0.0074 -0.0315  -0.0008 -0.0272 
5 -0.0039 -0.0283  0.0010 -0.0243  -0.0071 -0.0306  0.0019 -0.0266 
6 -0.0028 -0.0256  -0.0006 -0.0269  -0.0063 -0.0331  -0.0027 -0.0275 
7 -0.0026 -0.0271  0.0006 -0.0266  -0.0059 -0.0310  0.0000 -0.0280 
8 -0.0027 -0.0251  0.0010 -0.0240  -0.0010 -0.0286  -0.0003 -0.0231 
9 0.0027 -0.0177  0.0068 -0.0199  -0.0014 -0.0277  0.0048 -0.0243 
10 0.0121 -0.0124  0.0136 -0.0125  0.0162 -0.0120  0.0084 -0.0165 
            
 0.0292***  0.0202***  0.0339***  0.0160*** 









  net_dem   net_sup   buy_dem-sell_sup   buy_sup-sell_dem   sum_dem-sum_sup 
port mean median    mean median    mean median    mean median    mean median  
               
1 0.0006 -0.0001  0.0010 -0.0055  -0.0095 -0.0115  0.0110 0.0131  -0.0206 -0.0236 
2 0.0018 0.0052  -0.0010 -0.0043  -0.0066 -0.0101  0.0073 0.0129  -0.0139 -0.0195 
3 0.0017 0.0098  0.0049 -0.0013  -0.0011 -0.0032  0.0077 0.0086  -0.0088 -0.0147 
4 0.0038 0.0082  -0.0006 -0.0053  -0.0029 -0.0036  0.0060 0.0074  -0.0089 -0.0151 
5 0.0032 0.0082  -0.0010 -0.0064  -0.0058 -0.0062  0.0081 0.0097  -0.0139 -0.0149 
6 0.0034 0.0052  0.0021 0.0000  -0.0002 -0.0021  0.0057 0.0092  -0.0058 -0.0151 
7 0.0033 0.0073  0.0006 -0.0019  -0.0026 -0.0057  0.0065 0.0074  -0.0091 -0.0142 
8 -0.0017 0.0059  0.0013 -0.0025  -0.0024 -0.0051  0.0020 0.0059  -0.0044 -0.0099 
9 0.0040 0.0136  0.0020 -0.0035  -0.0021 0.0003  0.0081 0.0085  -0.0102 -0.0142 
10 -0.0041 0.0048  0.0052 0.0001  0.0036 -0.0021  -0.0026 0.0015  0.0063 -0.0025 
               
 -0.0047   0.00417   0.0132***  -0.0137***  0.0268*** 








Table 2.7 Regressions of institutional trading on abnormal attention 
Regressions of daily institutional trading variables (measured on day td) on daily abnormal attention measure (measured at month tm 
and day td) and monthly control variables (measured at month tm-1). Buys all, sells all and net all are aggregate daily buy (or sell or 
net= buy minus sell) transactions of institutional investors for a given stock divided by shares outstanding. Buy_dem, sell_dem, net_dem 
and sum_dem are daily institutional trading variables for liquidity demanding trades and buy_sup, sell_sup, net_sup and sum_sup for 
liquidity providing trades. Buy_dem-sell_sup, buy_sup-sell_dem and sum_dem-sum_sup variables have been calculated and aggregated 
on day-stock level. All institutional trading variables have been demeaned following equation 2.2.  Control variables are: beta is market 
beta, lnme is natural logarithm of firm’s market value, lnbm is natural logarithm of stock’s book-to-market ratio, rev is the stock return 
in the month preceding abnormal attention month, coskew is stock’s monthly co-skewness, ivol is idiosyncratic volatility, max is 
maximum daily return in each month, disp is analyst forecast dispersion, illiq is Amihud illiquidity factor, cvilliq is coefficient of 
variation in the Amihud illiquidity, sdturn is standard deviation of the monthly turnover over the past 12 months, sue is standardized 
unexpected earnings and voldu is dollar trading volume shock. All variables are standardized by cross-sectional demeaning and division 
by the cross-sectional standard deviation. The regression coefficients can thus be interpreted as the impact of a one-standard-deviation 
change and the regression intercept is zero. Panel A presents using Fama-MacBeth type regression with Newey-West adjusted standard 








Panel A Fama-MacBeth regressions with Newey-West standard errors 







             
attention 0.014*** 0.014*** -0.001 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** -0.001 0.001 0.003*** -0.004*** 0.005*** 
 9.170 9.700 -0.510 8.150 8.220 8.630 7.280 -1.110 0.910 2.680 -3.310 4.630 
beta 0.006** -0.001 0.005** 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004*   0.005** 0.002 0.004* 0.004** 0.000 
 2.110 -0.270 2.490 1.340 -0.420 -1.290 -1.660 2.320 1.090 1.650 2.380 -0.090 
lnme -0.003 0.006*** -0.008*** -0.005* 0.005* 0.004* 0.010*** -0.007*** -0.004** -0.010*** -0.002 -0.003*   
 -0.860 2.640 -3.160 -1.760 1.720 1.660 4.310 -3.200 -2.210 -4.370 -0.970 -1.960 
lnbm -0.008*** -0.010*** 0.002 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.005*** 0.003** -0.001 -0.001 0.004*** -0.004*** 
 -4.430 -5.450 1.280 -3.910 -4.540 -6.450 -3.030 2.060 -0.450 -0.930 3.100 -3.790 
mom 0.002 0.005** -0.003 0.001 0.00490** 0.008*** 0.003 -0.005** 0.002 0.000 -0.005** 0.004**  
 0.690 1.970 -1.060 0.270 2.080 3.580 1.350 -2.470 0.830 -0.160 -2.390 2.030 
rev -0.021*** -0.020*** 0.000 -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.011*** 0.000 -0.002 -0.005** 0.00444* -0.007*** 
 -5.780 -6.700 0.060 -5.600 -4.890 -6.070 -4.560 0.110 -0.760 -2.030 1.840 -3.880 
coskew -0.002 0.008*** -0.007*** 0.002 -0.004** 0.006** 0.007*** -0.003 -0.008*** -0.003 -0.008*** 0.003*   
 -0.820 2.790 -3.140 0.670 -2.020 2.470 3.290 -1.440 -4.290 -1.540 -3.770 1.960 
ivol 0.015*** 0.024*** -0.007* 0.005 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.017*** -0.012*** 0.001 -0.006* -0.007* 0.001 
 3.640 6.000 -1.960 1.430 4.380 6.040 4.840 -3.900 0.180 -1.870 -1.850 0.190 
max -0.002 -0.014*** 0.009** 0.002 -0.005 -0.013*** -0.009**  0.011*** 0.003 0.00716* 0.008** -0.001 
 -0.410 -3.320 2.040 0.610 -1.430 -3.690 -2.540 3.250 0.890 1.930 2.060 -0.230 
disp -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 -0.001 
 -0.880 1.000 -1.300 -1.300 -0.680 0.550 1.200 -1.150 -1.530 -1.940 -0.720 -0.870 
illiq -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.011**  0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 -0.700 -0.610 -0.150 0.830 1.490 0.040 2.400 0.450 -0.940 -0.120 -0.230 0.970 
cvilliq -0.003 0.006*** -0.007*** -0.004* 0.000 0.0046** 0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004* -0.007*** -0.004** -0.002 
 -1.150 2.680 -2.950 -1.710 -0.090 2.020 2.740 -3.010 -1.910 -3.140 -1.980 -1.260 
sdturn -0.011** -0.016*** 0.003 -0.009** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.020*** 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.00449* -0.001 
 -2.380 -3.510 0.990 -2.560 -4.220 -3.890 -5.580 1.230 0.790 0.530 1.660 -0.260 
sue 0.002 -0.004** 0.005*** 0.003 0.002 -0.004*** -0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.003** 0.004*** -0.001 
 1.110 -2.320 2.690 1.510 0.910 -2.790 -0.800 3.320 1.270 2.020 2.900 -0.590 
voldu 0.046*** 0.033*** 0.009*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.003* 0.015*** -0.001 0.011*** 
 21.090 14.920 4.280 20.400 16.570 13.610 13.850 4.990 1.900 8.000 -0.650 7.400 
             









Panel B Panel OLS with double-clustered standard errors 







atts 0.014*** 0.015*** -0.001 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** -0.002 0.001 0.003** -0.005*** 0.006*** 
 5.636 5.436 -0.581 5.358 5.726 5.546 4.441 -1.216 0.941 2.558 -2.776 4.358 
beta 0.007** -0.001 0.007*** 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005*   0.005*** 0.003* 0.005** 0.005** 0.001 
 2.157 -0.282 3.191 1.384 -0.484 -0.991 -1.828 2.856 1.726 2.481 2.505 0.397 
lnme -0.003 0.005* -0.007*** -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.008*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 
 -1.077 1.907 -3.589 -1.632 0.757 1.287 3.343 -3.666 -2.649 -4.404 -1.467 -1.214 
lnbm -0.009*** -0.013*** 0.003** -0.007** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.007**  0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 0.006*** -0.005*** 
 -2.783 -3.852 2.022 -2.406 -3.053 -4.377 -2.504 3.249 -0.435 -0.527 3.725 -3.576 
mom 0 0.002 -0.002 0 0.002 0.006** 0.001 -0.004* 0.002 0.001 -0.004* 0.004**  
 0.024 0.611 -0.636 0.096 0.79 1.99 0.338 -1.842 0.707 0.25 -1.892 2.043 
rev -0.019*** -0.021*** 0.003 -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.010*** 0.004* -0.003 -0.004* 0.007*** -0.008*** 
 -5.811 -6.95 0.987 -5.292 -4.56 -6.792 -3.95 1.681 -1.135 -1.787 2.846 -4.832 
coskew -0.003 0.003 -0.004* 0.001 -0.005 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.004** 0 -0.006*** 0.004**  
 -0.696 0.715 -1.758 0.22 -1.356 1.081 0.458 -1.021 -2.034 -0.225 -2.689 2.444 
ivol 0.014* 0.022*** -0.007 0.007 0.013** 0.018*** 0.018*** -0.008** -0.003 -0.006 -0.006* 0 
 1.852 2.835 -1.55 1.117 2.098 2.728 2.866 -2.458 -0.925 -1.637 -1.676 0.099 
max 0.003 -0.007 0.008* 0.004 0.001 -0.007* -0.007*   0.008** 0.006* 0.008** 0.006* 0.001 
 0.654 -1.608 1.893 1.061 0.154 -1.766 -1.893 2.267 1.918 2.265 1.874 0.441 
disp 0.001 0.005 -0.003 0 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0 
 0.251 0.913 -0.882 -0.073 0.636 0.957 0.856 -1.268 -0.498 -1.089 -0.746 -0.065 
illiq -0.009* -0.012** 0.002 -0.003 0 -0.008* 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0 0.003 -0.001 
 -1.882 -2.287 0.715 -0.722 0.098 -1.654 0.114 1.353 -0.33 0.053 1.1 -0.256 
cvilliq -0.003 0.006* -0.008*** -0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.006**  -0.006*** -0.005** -0.008*** -0.004* -0.003 
 -1.013 1.775 -2.8 -1.534 -0.235 1.351 2.114 -2.794 -2.19 -3.365 -1.829 -1.594 
sdturn -0.02 -0.025 0.003 -0.015 -0.028 -0.022 -0.03 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0 
 -0.854 -0.965 1.053 -0.839 -1.368 -1.027 -1.388 1.297 0.526 0.643 0.636 0.058 
sue 0.003 -0.004 0.005** 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.005** 0.002 0.004* 0.004** 0 
 0.995 -1.289 2.021 1.302 0.831 -1.567 -0.634 2.572 1.119 1.834 2.125 -0.239 
voldu 0.044*** 0.032*** 0.008*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.008*** 0.004* 0.015*** -0.002 0.012*** 
 11.75 9.551 3.074 12.464 10.094 9.12 9.044 3.837 1.843 6.401 -0.821 7.629 
             








Table 2.8 Attention portfolio sorts and Execution Shortfall 
Stocks listed on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq are sorted each day into 10 decile portfolios based on the abnormal attention measure. The 
table reports average values of Execution Shortfall following equation 2.1. on that day. The last row reports the difference in ES between 
high (highest attention days) and low (lowest attention days). T statistics are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
    
avg ES stock/day/buys of 
demanders 
  
avg ES stock/day/buys of 
suppliers 
  
avg ES stock/day/sells of 
demanders 
  
avg ES stock/day/sells of 
suppliers 
port # obs mean median  mean median  mean median  mean median 
             
1 130,620 0.00353 0.00056  -0.00338 -0.00043  0.00231 0.00036  -0.00188 -0.00018 
2 129,634 0.00363 0.00057  -0.00342 -0.00043  0.00237 0.00037  -0.00193 -0.00018 
3 129,902 0.00365 0.00058  -0.00341 -0.00044  0.00236 0.00037  -0.00188 -0.00019 
4 129,661 0.00361 0.00058  -0.00338 -0.00045  0.00234 0.00038  -0.00190 -0.00020 
5 129,559 0.00355 0.00059  -0.00333 -0.00043  0.00227 0.00038  -0.00196 -0.00022 
6 130,031 0.00375 0.00058  -0.00328 -0.00044  0.00227 0.00038  -0.00195 -0.00021 
7 129,863 0.00348 0.00058  -0.00329 -0.00044  0.00225 0.00038  -0.00188 -0.00021 
8 129,696 0.00354 0.00057  -0.00336 -0.00044  0.00233 0.00039  -0.00186 -0.00020 
9 129,892 0.00381 0.00058  -0.00341 -0.00044  0.00237 0.00037  -0.00274 -0.00019 
10 129,021 0.00378 0.00057  -0.00354 -0.00045  0.00248 0.00037  -0.00199 -0.00019 
             
  0.000245***  -0.000159***  0.000163***  -0.000114*** 









    avg ES stock/day vol dem   avg ES stock/day vol sup   avg ES stock/day  
port # obs mean median  mean median  mean median 
          
1 130,620 0.00585 0.00280  -0.00527 -0.00234  0.00059 0.00027 
2 129,634 0.00600 0.00287  -0.00537 -0.00239  0.00065 0.00029 
3 129,902 0.00601 0.00287  -0.00531 -0.00238  0.00072 0.00028 
4 129,661 0.00594 0.00283  -0.00529 -0.00238  0.00067 0.00026 
5 129,559 0.00582 0.00282  -0.00531 -0.00235  0.00053 0.00026 
6 130,031 0.00602 0.00276  -0.00524 -0.00233  0.00080 0.00027 
7 129,863 0.00573 0.00276  -0.00518 -0.00231  0.00058 0.00026 
8 129,696 0.00587 0.00278  -0.00524 -0.00233  0.00065 0.00028 
9 129,892 0.00619 0.00284  -0.00617 -0.00235  0.00004 0.00029 
10 129,021 0.00625 0.00284  -0.00555 -0.00241  0.00073 0.00027 
          
  0.000408***  -0.000275***  0.000134** 









Table 2.9 Regressions of abnormal return on institutional trading  
Regressions of abnormal return (measured on day td+n) on institutional trading variables (measured at month tm and on day td), abnormal 
attention (measured at month tm and on day td), interaction between attention and institutional trading and control variables (measured 
at month tm-1). Abnormal return is  based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) characteristics adjusted return in different 
horizons (beginning at t+1) abret5 is one week return (5 business days), abret10 two week return, abret20 a month return, abret59 a 
quarter return, and abret126 a 6 month return. Buys all, sells all and net all are aggregate daily buy (or sell or net= buy minus sell) 
transactions of institutional investors for a given stock divided by shares outstanding. Buy_dem, sell_dem, net_dem and sum_dem are 
daily institutional trading variables for liquidity demanding trades and buy_sup, sell_sup, net_sup and sum_sup for liquidity providing 
trades. Control variables are: beta is market beta, lnme is natural logarithm of firm’s market value, lnbm is natural logarithm of stock’s 
book-to-market ratio, rev is the stock return in the month preceding abnormal attention month, coskew is stock’s monthly co-skewness, 
ivol is idiosyncratic volatility, max is maximum daily return in each month, disp is analyst forecast dispersion, illiq is Amihud illiquidity 
factor, cvilliq is coefficient of variation in the Amihud illiquidity, sdturn is standard deviation of the monthly turnover over the past 12 
months, sue is standardized unexpected earnings and voldu is dollar trading volume shock. All independent variables are standardized 
by cross-sectional demeaning and division by the cross-sectional standard deviation and the returns are cross-sectionally demeaned. The 
regression coefficients can thus be interpreted as the impact of a one-standard-deviation change and the regression intercept is zero. 
Panel A presents using Fama-MacBeth type regression with Newey-West adjusted standard errors and Panel B presents panel OLS 









Panel A Fama-MacBeth regressions with Newey-West standard errors 
  abret5s abret10s abret20s abret59s abret126    abret5s abret10s abret20s abret59s abret126 
             
buys all 0.0098 -0.0199 -0.086*** -0.198*** -0.43***  sells all 0.031*** 0.0303** 0.0428** -0.0296 -0.0869 
 1.17 -1.51 -4.57 -5.74 -8.63   3.35 2.19 2.29 -0.88 -1.64 
abn att 0.0094 0.0101 0.0095 0.076*** 0.0691  abn att 0.00925 0.0122 0.0144 0.0786*** 0.0731 
 1.27 0.92 0.57 2.6 1.47   1.24 1.1 0.86 2.66 1.57 
interaction -0.0006 -0.0134 -0.035** -0.059** -0.0122  interaction 0.00321 -0.0138 -0.0366** -0.075*** -0.0199 
 -0.08 -1.14 -2.15 -2.14 -0.33   0.37 -1.14 -2.18 -2.71 -0.5 
                          
buy_dem 0.00306 -0.0198* -0.0827*** -0.184*** -0.392***  sell_dem 0.0273*** 0.0234* 0.0302* -0.00036 0.00481 
 0.42 -1.82 -5.24 -6.49 -9.27   3.14 1.92 1.81 -0.01 0.1 
abn att 0.00842 0.00892 0.00734 0.0725** 0.0596  abn att 0.00913 0.0113 0.0129 0.0745** 0.0668 
 1.14 0.81 0.44 2.46 1.28   1.23 1.03 0.78 2.53 1.44 
interaction -0.00483 -0.00876 -0.0275* -0.0417* 0.00136  interaction 0.00229 -0.0112 -0.0227 -0.0664*** -0.0161 
 -0.67 -0.88 -1.89 -1.67 0.04   0.29 -0.95 -1.42 -2.69 -0.48 
                          
buy_sup 0.0212*** 0.00474 -0.0322** -0.0886*** -0.217***  sell_sup 0.0123 0.0191* 0.0304* -0.0429 -0.127*** 
 2.74 0.42 -2.05 -3.11 -5.1   1.61 1.69 1.87 -1.61 -3.12 
abn att 0.00994 0.0119 0.0105 0.0728** 0.0637  abn att 0.00957 0.0113 0.0132 0.0753** 0.0666 
 1.34 1.09 0.62 2.48 1.36   1.3 1.03 0.79 2.54 1.44 
interaction 0.00221 -0.0122 -0.0235* -0.033 -0.0157  interaction -0.0017 -0.0176 -0.0419*** -0.0610** -0.0195 
 0.29 -1.1 -1.67 -1.27 -0.42   -0.2 -1.59 -2.65 -2.3 -0.48 
             
N 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669  N 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 








  abret5s abret10s abret20s abret59s abret126 
      
net all -0.0217** -0.0449*** -0.106*** -0.144*** -0.282*** 
 -2.39 -3.42 -5.98 -4.57 -5.67 
abn att 0.00809 0.0104 0.013 0.0796*** 0.0684 
 1.07 0.94 0.78 2.69 1.48 
interaction 0.00356 0.0128 0.00864 0.0177 0.0044 
 0.42 1.05 0.53 0.69 0.12 
            
net_dem -0.0195** -0.0341*** -0.0867*** -0.137*** -0.278*** 
 -2.44 -3.15 -5.74 -5.27 -6.47 
abn att 0.008 0.00926 0.0103 0.0742** 0.0595 
 1.06 0.84 0.62 2.52 1.29 
interaction 0.000224 0.0121 0.0032 0.0139 0.00671 
 0.03 1.11 0.21 0.59 0.21 
            
net_sup -0.00185 -0.0185* -0.0517*** -0.0329 -0.0724* 
 -0.25 -1.67 -3.4 -1.31 -1.84 
abn att 0.00898 0.011 0.0119 0.0738** 0.0561 
 1.2 1 0.71 2.49 1.21 
interaction 0.00546 0.00828 0.013 0.0341 0.0131 
 0.67 0.76 0.96 1.44 0.36 
      
N 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 









Panel B Panel OLS with double-clustered standard errors 
  abret5s abret10s abret20s abret59s abret126    abret5s abret10s abret20s abret59s abret126 
             
buys all 0.0146 -0.0079 -0.0501** -0.140*** -0.312***  sells all 0.0331*** 0.0302** 0.0426* -0.0115 -0.0662 
 1.45 -0.51 -2.09 -2.87 -3.61   3.37 1.98 1.73 -0.23 -0.75 
abn att 0.0105 0.0138 0.019 0.0553 0.0181  abn att 0.00998 0.014 0.0196 0.0549 0.0159 
 1.23 0.9 0.67 0.78 0.14   1.17 0.91 0.7 0.78 0.12 
interaction -0.0045 0.00312 -0.00471 -0.0737** -0.0642  interaction 0.00091 -0.0105 -0.0454** -0.105*** -0.0944* 
 -0.52 0.26 -0.25 -2.04 -1.23   0.11 -0.87 -2.43 -2.89 -1.95 
                          
buy_dem 0.0112 -0.00959 -0.0497*** -0.143*** -0.303***  sell_dem 0.0271*** 0.0211 0.0311 0.018 0.0322 
 1.28 -0.74 -2.61 -3.69 -4.39   2.97 1.56 1.48 0.44 0.44 
abn att 0.0106 0.0138 0.0187 0.0536 0.0152  abn att 0.0102 0.0139 0.0192 0.0534 0.0134 
 1.23 0.9 0.66 0.76 0.12   1.19 0.91 0.68 0.76 0.11 
interaction -0.0050 0.00588 -0.00353 -0.0623** -0.0371  interaction -0.00021 -0.00716 -0.0367** -0.0919*** -0.0799* 
 -0.7 0.63 -0.23 -2.04 -0.82   -0.03 -0.65 -2.13 -2.7 -1.82 
                          
buy_sup 0.0149 0.00403 -0.0162 -0.0461 -0.142**  sell_sup 0.0141 0.0153 0.0202 -0.0576 -0.162** 
 1.58 0.3 -0.79 -1.14 -2.07   1.61 1.22 1.03 -1.49 -2.51 
abn att 0.0104 0.014 0.0182 0.0523 0.0151  abn att 0.0105 0.0141 0.0192 0.053 0.0146 
 1.21 0.92 0.64 0.74 0.12   1.23 0.92 0.68 0.75 0.11 
interaction -0.000596 -0.00381 0.00005 -0.0473 -0.0648  interaction -0.00426 -0.0097 -0.0373** -0.0774*** -0.0708* 
 -0.08 -0.33 0 -1.51 -1.44   -0.58 -0.97 -2.48 -2.59 -1.72 
             
N 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669  N 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 








  abret5s abret10s abret20s abret59s abret126 
      
net all -0.0188* -0.0351** -0.0761*** -0.101** -0.191*** 
 -1.93 -2.41 -3.32 -2.42 -2.9 
abn att 0.0105 0.0139 0.018 0.0495 0.0101 
 1.22 0.9 0.64 0.7 0.08 
interaction -0.00656 0.00864 0.0329** 0.0284 0.0321 
 -0.7 0.69 2.15 0.97 0.74 
            
net_dem -0.0143 -0.0267** -0.0639*** -0.119*** -0.236*** 
 -1.56 -2.09 -3.41 -3.66 -4.72 
abn att 0.0105 0.0139 0.0181 0.0495 0.0102 
 1.22 0.91 0.64 0.7 0.08 
interaction -0.00281 0.00985 0.0281** 0.0315 0.0447 
 -0.39 0.98 2.12 1.28 1.2 
            
net_sup -0.00444 -0.0121 -0.0307 -0.00101 0.000364 
 -0.5 -0.98 -1.62 -0.03 0.01 
abn att 0.0105 0.0139 0.0179 0.0494 0.0103 
 1.23 0.9 0.63 0.7 0.08 
interaction 0.000254 0.0025 0.0220* 0.0149 0.00412 
 0.04 0.26 1.79 0.6 0.11 
      
N 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 1,073,669 









Figure 2.1 Abnormal institutional trading variables in abnormal attention deciles 
The figure presents the average abnormal institutional trading variables in the deciles sorted on abnormal attention. Buy_dem and 
sell_dem are daily institutional trading variables for liquidity demanding trades and buy_sup and sell_sup for liquidity providing trades 
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Figure 2.2 Institutional liquidity demand and supply in abnormal attention deciles 
The figure presents the average abnormal institutional trading variables in the deciles sorted on abnormal attention. Demand volume is 
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Figure 2.3 Execution Shortfall in abnormal attention deciles 
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Below I provide detailed definitions of control variables. 
Size (lnme) – natural logarithm of the stock’s market value (price per share multiplied by shares 
outstanding) each quarter. 
Book-to-market ratio (lnbm) – natural logarithm of the ratio of book to market value, where book 
value is the book value of stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if 
available), minus the book value of preferred stock for the last fiscal year end in t -1; the market 
value is calculated at the end of December of t -1.17  
Reversal (rev) – stock return over a month preceding the attention and institutional trading 
measurement month, the variable is winsorized quarterly at 1 and 99%. 
Momentum (mom) - the cumulative return of a stock over 11 months ending one month prior to 
the portfolio formation month (the month preceding the quarter of institutional trading), as in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the variable is winsorized quarterly at 1 and 99%. 
Maximum daily return in each month (max) is stock’s maximum daily return in a month 
following Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011). 
Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) - stock’s quarterly unexpected earnings (UE) scaled by 
its standard deviation over the preceding eight quarters (minimum four). Following Ball and 
Brown (1968) and Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), unexpected earnings are defined as the 
difference between stock’s basic EPS excluding extraordinary items in quarters q and q-4: 
𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑞 = 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞 − 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−4 (A2.1) 
Stock idiosyncratic volatility (ivol) is measured monthly as the standard deviation of the residuals 
from the following regression of daily excess stock returns on market excess returns and size and 
book-to-market factors of Fama and French (1993). Risk free rate used to compute excess returns 
is the rate of one-month treasury bills and market return is the CRSP value-weighted index; the 
rates and factors are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website.18 
𝑅𝑖,𝑑 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑑 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑑) + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑑 + 𝜑𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑑 + 𝑖,𝑑 (A2.2) 
                                                 





The variable is winsorized quarterly at 1 and 99%. 
Market beta of the stock (beta) is estimated based on time-series regression of monthly excess 
stock returns on current and lagged market excess returns over 60 months (minimum 24). The beta 
is calculated as a sum of coefficients of current and lagged excess stock returns. Risk free rate used 
to compute excess returns is the rate of one-month treasury bills and market return is the CRSP 
value-weighted index. 
Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (disp) is computed as the standard deviation of annual EPS 
forecasts divided by the absolute value of the average outstanding forecast (Diether, Malloy, 
Sherbina, 2002), the variable is winsorized quarterly at 1 and 99%. 
Stock’s monthly co-skewness (coskew) is based on the monthly return observations over the prior 
60 months (min 24), following Harvey and Siddique (2000). 
Sdturn is a standard deviation of the monthly turnover over the past 12 months. 









Institutional investor trading patterns are crucial for functioning of the stock market. Institutions 
are more informed, active investors with access to the resources, so they can have significant 
influence on stock prices, volatility and liquidity. This impact becomes particularly strong if 
institutional trades are correlated. When institutional investors herd, they can potentially 
destabilize information efficiency in the market by driving the prices away from fundamentals, 
increasing volatility and causing bubbles. But if institutions follow their peers with better quality 
information about security prices, they may actually reduce misvaluation.  
Herding can plausibly be related to uncertainty, as following other trades may be a tempting 
strategy as in a risky environment with unclear security valuations. The impact of herding on stock 
returns depends on the quality of information that is being copied by the investor crowd. Investors 
may herd for fear of unfavorable performance assessments should they deviate from the majority. 
It is also possible that herding occurs without intentional conformism, but when institutions 
respond to similar signals or display similar investment styles and strategies.  
I study patterns of institutional herding over the past 35 years in connection to market 
uncertainty and future stock returns. Prior research concentrated on cross-sectional analysis of 
herding in individual firms, and explored different investment groups, market segments and stock 
types. I would like to offer a broader view on the herding over time. My aim is to see if herding of 




and trading volume. I want to explore how herding relates to aggregate uncertainty in the stock 
market and events related to overall market risk. I analyze the relationship of herding with 
subsequent returns to gauge its impact on aggregate price informativeness. 
Following Sias (2004) dynamic intertemporal herding measurement methodology based 
on quarterly 13f institutional holdings data, I find significant evidence of herding by institutional 
investors during the last 35 years. Interestingly, I observe large shocks to herding activity during 
the dot com bubble in 2000-2001, in time of high uncertainty regarding the valuations of new 
companies. I observe positive relation between herding and aggregate market uncertainty as 
measured by average stock correlation from Pollet and Willson (2010).  
The return analysis presented here does not however point to the distorting impact of 
herding on information incorporation into stock prices. I document a positive relationship between 
herding activity and next quarter aggregate market return and I do not find reversal in the following 
3 quarters. Such finding contributes to the view that herding may in fact enhance overall pricing 
efficiency in the market. 
The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews existing literature on 
herding and its interpretation, section 3.3 describes the databases used and variable formation, 
section 3.4 presents evidence of herding over time, section 3.5 analyses the impact of herding on 
future returns and section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
The impact of institutional investors on the stock market is particularly profound if they 




decisions, it can potentially either stabilize or destabilize stock prices. On the one hand, their trades 
may have a distorting impact on financial markets by increasing information inefficiency and stock 
price volatility, exacerbating price changes and leading to bubbles. This would happen if 
institutions excessively purchased overvalued stocks and sold undervalued ones. On the other 
hand, they may bring prices closer to the fundamentals and improve incorporation of information 
into stock prices if investors herd into undervalued stocks and out of the overvalued ones, driven 
by private information. 
There are a number of possible reasons for herding behavior, which determine the ultimate 
impact of herding on the stock market. The first mechanism, informational cascades, as described 
by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992) is when institutional investors 
infer information from previous trades of other investors, often foregoing their own private, 
perhaps noisy information.  
Second reason can be related to reputational risk – managers concerned with their 
performance evaluations may disregard their own private information and follow the others, not 
to stand out from their peer group (Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Trueman (1994)). 
It is also possible that institutions react to the same exogenous signals, such as cross-
sectionally correlated private information (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) and Hirschleifer, 
Subrahmanyan and Titman (1994)). 
Finally, institutions have been shown to share common preferences or aversion for security 
characteristics, which can lead them to trade in a similar fashion (Falkenstein (1996), Del Guercio 
(1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennet, Sias and Starks (2003)). In addition to that, when 





Information uncertainty can greatly contribute to the herding behavior. When investors 
cannot access or process information, they turn to imitate others, whom they presume better 
informed (Fernandez, Garcia-Merino, Mayoral, Santos and Vallelado (2011)). Boortz, Kremer, 
Jurkatis and Nautz (2014) show how herding intensifies in times of increased information 
asymmetry risk and market stress, when investors are more pessimistic and uncertain about stock 
valuations.  
Despite anecdotal evidence on institutional herding, there is no consensus in the literature 
on aggregate herding in the stock market. Some authors point to existence of herding in different 
market segments, usually characterized by lower liquidity and transparency (Can, Ha and Li 
(2012)).  Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find little support for herding by pension fund 
managers in individual stocks, based on their measure of unexpected imbalance between the 
number of buyers and sellers in a given security. They conclude that investors’ trading styles offset 
each other, so as a result there is no destabilizing impact on the prices. Similarly, Grinblatt, Titman 
and Wermers (1995) point to low herding among mutual funds. 
Wermers (1999) also finds little evidence for systematic herding among mutual funds, but 
he identifies higher intensity of herding behavior by growth investors and among small stocks, 
especially when investors herd to sell. Finally, he documents that herding is related to momentum 
trading by selling past losers and buying past winners. 
In contrast, Sias (2004), using the cross-sectional temporal dependence herding measure, 
provides strong evidence of herding related to informational cascades. Interestingly, he shows that 
past trading is a stronger determinant of future herding than momentum trading. Choi and Sias 
(2009) provide evidence for institutional herding within industries which they link to institutional 




The role and reasons for institutional trading can be closer examined by looking at sign and 
persistence of future returns of stocks subject to herding. Permanent positive relationship between 
institutions trading together and future returns supports stabilizing role of institutional herding, 
because it implies bringing the prices closer to fundamentals. Nosfiger and Sias (1999) and 
Wermers (1999)  show positive return changes subsequent to institutional herding consistent with 
investors copying private fundamental information-based trading. Sias (2004) finds weak positive 
relationship, consistent with informational cascades and institutional trading in response to similar 
signals.  
On the other hand, short term positive returns and long-term reversals following herding 
point to destabilizing effect. Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2011) present a model consistent with 
the reputation concern-driven trading which leads to short term positive returns and long-term 
reversals, destabilizing prices. Gutierrez and Kelley (2009) show empirical evidence of long-term 
price reversal subsequent to herding, supporting the destabilizing view on herding activity, which 
drives prices away from their intrinsic values. Similar evidence can be found in San (2007); Puckett 
and Yan (2009) and Brown, Wei and Wermers (2009). 
 
3.3 Database and variable construction 
The analysis of herding is based on the quarterly institutional holdings. I use data from 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database based on Form 13F SEC filings of 
institutional managers with at least $100 million in Assets under Management from 3rd quarter of 
1980 to 4th quarter of 2014. This database includes all types of institutions, such as mutual funds, 
pension funds, hedge funds, banks, insurance companies and others. The institutions report on the 




herding I observe does not measure potential similar trading of funds belonging to the same family. 
I obtain the stock-related information (returns, shares outstanding, prices and S&P constituents 
list) for common stocks from Center for Research in Security Press (CRSP). Aggregate dividend, 
earnings, term spread and stock volatility variables come from Amit Goyal’s website. 
I use Sias (2004) dynamic herding measure of cross sectional correlation between 
institutional demand last quarter and the following quarter. I infer institutional trading from the 
levels of institutional holdings, where I define “buys” as increases in holdings and “sells” as 
decreases in holdings. I also infer terminating sells and initiating buys. As argued by Grinblatt, 
Titman and Wermers (1995), in order to capture meaningful trading copying behavior, the herding 
analysis should concentrate on stocks with a non-trivial number of investors. Thus, I measure 
herding for stocks with at least 20 institutional investors in a given quarter.   
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics of the number of stocks and institutions trading at 
eight points in time and time-series average for the whole sample. The number of stocks in the 
sample has been increasing and reached its peak in the second half of the 1990s, and then 
proceeded to go down. In the subsample restricted to stocks with at least 20 institutions trading, 
the number of stocks is proportionately smaller, increasing from 24% to 80% of all stocks. This 
points to the fact that nowadays majority of the stocks are traded by a large number of institutions. 
This is related to the increase of the number of institutional investors from 455 in 1980 to 3,245 in 
2014. The average number of instructions trading in a stock has increased from 20 in 1980 to 149, 
and each institution is trading on average 170 stocks. 
I define pit as a proportion of the number of buys in all trades made by institutions in a 







  (3.1) 







where E(pit) is cross-sectional average of pit over the quarter and σ(pit) is the cross-sectional 
standard deviation. The standardized variable is characterized by zero mean and unit variance. 
Then each quarter I regress the Δit on its lagged value and extract slope coefficient βt that serves as 
a measure of intertemporal herding. 
 ∆𝑖,𝑡= 𝛽𝑡∆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡 (3.3) 
In order to analyze the relationship between uncertainty in the market and herding, I use 
the average correlation measure following Pollet and Willson (2010). The authors propose that 
correlation between individual stock returns can serve as a better proxy for true aggregate market 
risk than aggregate stock variance. They argue that since most asset returns have some market 
return component, in times of increased market risk, they are more likely to co-move together. 
Average correlation is based on daily returns of stocks that belong to S&P 500 index and 
each quarter is defined as: 
 𝐴𝐶𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑘,𝑡?̂?𝑗𝑘,𝑡𝑘≠𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 , (3.4) 
where  wj,t
 is the market capitalization of stock j divided by the market capitalization of all S&P 
500 stocks and ?̂?𝑗𝑘,𝑡 is the sample correlation of stocks j and k in a given quarter based on sample 










The control variables, from Goyal and Welch (2008), sourced from Amit Goyal’s website, 
are defined as follows; dividend yield in the difference between the log of dividends and the log 
of lagged prices, earnings price ratio is the difference between the log of earnings and the log of 
prices, term spread is the difference between the long term yield on government bonds and the 
Treasury-bill and Stock Variance is computed as sum of squared daily returns on the S&P 500. 
 
3.4 Evidence of herding and its relation to uncertainty 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics. I find a significant evidence of herding, with average 
herding Sias Beta – cross sectional correlation between current and lagged institutional trading - 
of 0.402, almost twice the size of the average beta reported by Sias (2004), 0.205. The mean and 
median of the herding measure are very close, so the result is not driven by outlier observations. 
As seen in the last row of Table 3.1, Sias beta has fluctuated over time. Figure 1 graphs 
Sias herding measure over time. The institutional herding varied over 1980s and started steadily 
increasing in the 1990s, especially during the final years of the decade, coinciding with the 
speculative tech bubble from 1997 to 2000. During the Tech bubble itself (March 2000- October 
2002) there are large jumps in the herding variable, with its all-sample high value in 3rd quarter of 
2001 (which also coincided with September 11 attacks) and all-sample low in the 4th quarter of 
1999, just before the dot-com crash. In the 2000s the herding has been experiencing a slow 
decrease. The variation in institutional herding over time seems to point to its relation to overall 




dot coms. In an uncertain environment, institutions may doubt the quality of their own information, 
true valuations of securities may be unknown and the pressure of reputational risk may be high. In 
such case institutions are likely to adopt a strategy of following other institutions, assuming those 
have better information. However, in such cases the majority of investors may not have superior 
information, and then herding results in stock misevaluation, or, in case of bubbles, overvaluation. 
Table 3.3 includes Pearson correlations between variables used in this study. Aggregate 
herding is persistent, as shown by the autocorrelation coefficient of 0.282. Sias herding measure 
is positively correlated with aggregate future returns, albeit not significantly. Similarly, there is a 
positive correlation between Sias beta and average correlation, though lacking significance. A 
better picture of the relationship between herding and market uncertainty, as measures by average 
correlation can be observed on Figure 3.1. It shows that the positive co-movement of the two 
variables becomes distorted at the beginning of 2000’s, during dot com bubble and following the 
Black Monday of 1987 crash. 
 
3.5 Herding and future returns 
I seek to establish the relationship between herding of all institutions and aggregate future 
returns in order to see if it holds a destabilizing impact on the stock market prices. If herding is 
driven by institutions trading for reputational reasons, following fads, preferences for certain 
securities, then it should lead to negative future returns as prices adjust to their fundamental levels 
after being inflated or deflated by institutions. Conversely, if trading helps to spread and reinforce 
private information owned by a few, I should expect a positive relationship to prices. Existing 
literature has brought mixed evidence based on shorter sample periods, subsamples of institutions 




herding measure and control variables dividend yield, price-to-equity ratio, term spread and stock 
variance and present results in Table 3.4. Panel A shows regressions for the full sample; for the 
purpose of Panel B, I exclude newly issued securities, following Wermers (1999). In particular, I 
do not include the stocks within 4 quarters of their initial public offering. This allows me to focus 
on regular trading patterns as oppose to IPO-related behavior.  
I find that quarterly return on CRSP value-weighted index and the quarterly return on S&P 
500 index are positively related to institutional correlated trading with coefficient from 0.11 to 
0.17 for the full sample.  This implies that one standard deviation change in the herding measure 
predicts 1% next quarter aggregate return. The coefficient estimates for IPO-excluded observations 
are very similar and slightly stronger. This result points to a non-distorting view on herding by 
institutional investors and suggests that such behavior may indeed contribute to better 
incorporation of information into stock prices, confirming Sias (2004) proposition. 
In order to confirm the impact of herding on the security market, I observe a longer horizon 
of future returns to see if positive short-term one quarter returns are followed by reversals, as found 
in Gutierrez and Kelley (2009), San (2007), Puckett and Yan (2009) and Brown, Wei and Wermers 
(2009). In Table 3.5 I present future aggregate returns in quarters 1 to 4 regressed on institutional 
herding measure. For all three return specifications I find the positive relationship with herding to 
become insignificant in further quarters. I do not however observe reversal. Thus it seems that 






Trading of institutional investors has a huge impact of market efficiency, especially if 
institutions herd. Their impact can be beneficial or detrimental to market stability. This study 
analyses aggregate institutional herding over the past 35 years as connected to market uncertainty 
and stock returns. I find significant evidence of herding as captured by Sias (2004) herding 
measure, with interesting jumps in herding around dot-com bubble, when uncertainty about stock 
valuation was high. I document positive relation between herding and aggregate market 
uncertainty as measured by average stock correlation from Pollet and Willson (2010). Finally, I 
show a positive relationship between herding activity and next quarter aggregate market return 
without subsequent reversal, pointing to the beneficial role of institutions in price informativeness. 
There are many questions that I still would like to pursue, in particular explore what 
impacts the relationship between herding and market uncertainty? I would like to test if aggregate 
herding predicts events related to information uncertainty, such as price anomalies or earnings 















Table 3.1 13f institutional investors and their holdings 
Summary statistics of institutional investors and their holdings, calculated each quarter. The table contains a snapshot of cross-sectional 
statistics every 5 years and a time-series average. # stocks with min 20 investors is the number of stocks for the sample that I restrict to 
those with at least 20 institutions trading in a quarter, Average # institutions, min 20 is the average number of institutions in a sample 
restricted to stocks with min 20 investors and Average beta Sias is the herding measure following Sias (2004). 
 
Date 30.09.80 30.09.85 30.09.90 30.09.95 30.09.00 30.09.05 30.09.10 31.12.14 Average 
#stocks 2,641 4,047 4,525 5,999 5,930 4,750 3,963 3,428 4,682 
#stocks with min 20 investors 634 1,079 1,388 2,273 3,042 3,169 2,870 2,751 2,206 
# institutions 455 668 894 1,166 1,670 2,163 2,619 3,245 1,529 
Average # institutions 20 24 30 36 58 87 105 149 58 
Average # institutions, min 20 69 75 85 84 107 126 141 183 104 
Average # stocks per institution 117 146 152 186 205 191 158 157 170 










Table 3.2 Time-series descriptive statistics of variables. 
betaSias is herding measure following Sias(2004), AvgCorr is average correlation of stock returns following Pollet and Willson 
(2010). ret_ew is the quarterly return on CRSP equal-weighted index, ret_vw is the quarterly return on CRSP value-weighted index, 
ret-SP500 is the quarterly return on S&P 500 index. D/Y is aggregate dividend yield, E/P is aggregate earnings price ratio, tms is 
aggregate term spread and StockVar is aggregate stock variance. Autocorrelation statistic is measured by regressing a given variable 
on its lag and reporting the coefficient. 
 
stats betaSias AvgCorr ret_ew ret_vw ret_SP500 D/Y E/P tms StockVar 
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 
mean 0.402 0.148 0.034 0.030 0.023 -3.700 -2.938 0.023 0.008 
sd 0.082 0.059 0.112 0.085 0.080 0.421 0.461 0.014 0.013 
min 0.097 0.039 -0.291 -0.237 -0.232 -4.497 -4.807 -0.035 0.001 
p50 0.405 0.141 0.031 0.037 0.027 -3.793 -2.908 0.025 0.005 
max 0.611 0.356 0.346 0.213 0.209 -2.773 -2.023 0.045 0.113 
skewness -0.231 0.940 -0.020 -0.542 -0.569 0.206 -1.044 -0.834 5.866 










Table 3.3 Pearson correlations of variables 
betaSias is herding measure following Sias(2004), AvgCorr is average correlation of stock returns following Pollet and Willson (2010). 
ret_ew is the quarterly return on CRSP equal-weighted index, ret_vw is the quarterly return on CRSP value-weighted index, ret-SP500 
is the quarterly return on S&P 500 index. D/Y is aggregate dividend yield, E/P is aggregate earnings price ratio, tms is aggregate term 







AvgCorr ret_ew ret_vw  ret SP500 D/Y E/P tms Stock Var 
LAG betaSias 1           
            
betaSias 0.2829* 1          
 0.0008           
LEAD betaSias 0.1522 0.2829* 1         
 0.0769 0.0008          
AvgCorr 0.1021 0.1102 -0.0331 1        
 0.24 0.20 0.70         
ret_ew 0.1085 0.1081 0.0955 0.1017 1       
 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.24        
ret_vw 0.0228 0.1281 0.0795 0.0793 0.8721* 1      
 0.79 0.13 0.36 0.36 0.00       
ret SP500 0.024 0.1144 0.0659 0.0749 0.8245* 0.9909* 1     
 0.78 0.18 0.44 0.38 0.00 0.00      
D/Y -0.2036 -0.2323* -0.2275* -0.0339 0.0858 0.1529 0.139 1    
 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.69 0.32 0.07 0.10     
E/P -0.2447* -0.1961 -0.1555 -0.0647 -0.059 0.0496 0.0514 0.6097* 1   
 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.45 0.49 0.56 0.55 0.00    
tms 0.0296 -0.0731 -0.1368 0.1692 0.1183 0.0761 0.0698 0.0157 -0.2612* 1  
 0.73 0.39 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.38 0.42 0.85 0.00   
Stock Var 0.1062 0.1388 0.0621 0.5897* 0.2226* 0.1213 0.1057 -0.0954 -0.3261* 0.0823 1 








Table 3.4 Regressions of aggregate market return on herding 
Regressions of aggregate market return on herding measure following Sias (2004) beta Sias and control variables. Aggregate return is 
measured by ret_ew, the quarterly return on CRSP equal-weighted index, ret_vw, the quarterly return on CRSP value-weighted index 
and ret-SP500, the quarterly return on S&P 500 index. D/Y is aggregate dividend yield, E/P is aggregate earnings price ratio, tms is 
aggregate term spread and StockVar is aggregate stock variance.  
Panel A Full sample 
 
  ret_ew ret_ew ret_vw ret_vw ret_SP500 ret_SP500    
       
betaSias 0.147 0.158 0.133** 0.173*** 0.112* 0.147*** 
 -1.34 -1.35 -2.02 -2.92 -1.84 -2.69 
       
D/Y  0.0409**  0.0367*  0.0302 
  -2.01  -1.94  -1.59 
       
E/P  -0.00961  0.00589  0.00691 
  (-0.50)  -0.31  -0.36 
       
tms  0.777  0.509  0.458 
  -1.41  -1.1  -0.94 
       
StockVar  1.779**  0.805**  0.679**  
  -2.34  -2.3  -2.18 
       










Panel B Sample excluding first 4 quarters following stock’s IPO.  
  ret_ew ret_ew ret_vw ret_vw ret_SP500 ret_SP500    
       
betaSias_NI 0.141 0.153 0.133** 0.174*** 0.114* 0.150*** 
 -1.28 -1.28 -2.08 -2.92 -1.91 -2.72 
       
D/Y  0.0410**  0.0370*  0.0305 
  -2  -1.95  -1.6 
       
E/P  -0.00942  0.00621  0.00721 
  (-0.49)  -0.33  -0.37 
       
tms  0.784  0.521  0.47 
  -1.43  -1.14  -0.98 
       
StockVar  1.778**  0.799**  0.672**  
  -2.36  -2.33  -2.19 
       










Table 3.5 Long-term herding-return relationship. 
  equal-weighted CRSP   value-weighted CRSP   S&P 500 returns 























                 
beta20 0.153 0.176 0.192 -0.151    0.174*** 0.0723 0.102 -0.0442    0.150*** 0.0686 0.0667 -0.0396 
 1.28 1.45 1.52 -0.99    2.92 0.74 0.99 -0.44    2.72 0.75 0.7 -0.43 
                 
d_y 0.0410** 0.0133 0.0264 0.0268    0.0370* 0.0166 0.025 0.0312    0.0305 0.012 0.0187 0.0265 
 2 0.56 1.09 1    1.95 0.94 1.36 1.49    1.6 0.72 1.05 1.34 
                 
e_p -0.00942 0.0212 -0.00698 -0.0241    0.00621 0.0276* 0.0136 -0.00055    0.00721 0.0281* 0.0164 0.00302 
 -0.49 0.99 -0.33 -1    0.33 1.75 0.91 -0.03    0.37 1.87 1.18 0.18 
                 
tms 0.784 1.555*** 0.694 0.204    0.521 1.105** 0.696 0.511    0.47 1.021** 0.718 0.599 
 1.43 2.85 1.15 0.28    1.14 2.25 1.52 0.93    0.98 2.11 1.63 1.16 
                 
svar 1.778** 1.27 0.112 0.416    0.799** 0.718 0.216 0.132    0.672** 0.644 0.228 0.0582 
 2.36 1.4 0.29 1.21    2.33 0.98 0.74 0.41    2.19 0.92 0.75 0.19 
                 









Figure 3.1 Time-series trends of Sias herding measure and average correlation 
The chart presents the herding measure following Sias(2004) and average correlation of stock returns following Pollet and Willson 
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